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 Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has threatened U.S. security interests, 
pursued greater regional dominance, and displayed belligerence toward U.S. allies.  To 
mitigate these challenges, policymakers and scholars should seek a greater understanding 
of Iran’s behavior.  This thesis portfolio provides insight into Iran’s international, 
regional, and national behavior by combining knowledge traditionally contained in area 
studies with revolutionary and international relations theories.  In chapter one, the thesis 
considers the United States’ relationship with Iran, with a particular focus on determining 
what policies would most effectively lessen the threat of Iran’s nuclear program.  This 
chapter recommends that the United States maintain sanctions, increase public diplomacy 
efforts, and continue engagement attempts towards Iran.  Sanctions and negotiations 
should be conducted multilaterally, whenever possible, to increase U.S. legitimacy and 
ensure the prudent use of U.S. power.  Chapter two considers how Shiism affects Iran’s 
posture in the Middle East.  Although Shiism has an influence on Iran’s regional policies, 
this chapter argues that pragmatism plays a greater role in Iranian policymaking.  Finally, 
by analyzing the stability of Iran’s regime through the lens of revolutionary theory, 
chapter three demonstrates that most scholars have likely overestimated the Iranian 
regime’s longevity. 
 As discussed in this thesis portfolio, the United States must chart a course with 
Iran that simultaneously attempts to improve U.S.-Iran relations, mitigate security 
concerns, and reassure U.S. allies in the region.  The United States’ relationship with Iran 
will likely remain strained, at least for the near future.  However, a better understanding 
of the nation should enable scholars and policymakers to improve this relationship.  
 iii 
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The United States’ relationship with Iran has been difficult since the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent founding of the Islamic Republic.  From the 
Iranian hostage crisis to former president George W. Bush’s axis of evil speech, the two 
countries’ relations have been characterized by hostility, distrust, and polarization.  U.S.-
Iran relations are currently at a critical juncture as nuclear talks continue under the 
presidential leadership of Iran’s Hassan Rouhani.  Moreover, Iran’s support of terrorist 
groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, along with the nation’s controversial nuclear 
program, poses security challenges for the United States and its allies, including Israel.   
As a country with large oil reserves, Iran’s behavior also has implications for U.S. 
energy security.  In particular, the nation ranks second in the world for natural gas 
reserves and fourth for proven oil reserves.  Despite U.S. and European Union sanctions 
targeting Iranian oil exports, Iran exported enough oil in 2012 to rank as one of the 
world’s 10 highest exporters.1  Iran’s jurisdiction over the northern coast of the strategic 
Strait of Hormuz provides the nation with additional leverage.  Should this waterway in 
the Persian Gulf close, markets would lose one fourth of the world’s supply of oil.  
Regardless of whether Iran could successfully block the strait,2 the nation’s power is 
enhanced by its control over part of this waterway.3  Policymakers and scholars should 
also be interested in Iran because of the nation’s key position of power in the Middle 
                                                                          
1 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Iran: Country Analysis Brief Overview,” updated March 28, 2013, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=IR (accessed February 22, 2014). 
 
2 Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,”  International Security 33, no. 1 
(summer 2008): 82, 86.   
 
3 Ibid.  
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East.  In recent years, Iran has pursued policies designed to further its rise as a regional 
hegemon.  Such a rise could further threaten U.S. security interests. 
Thus, now more than ever, it is crucial for policymakers and scholars to 
understand Iran’s behavior.  However, many scholars and policymakers have failed in 
this task.  For instance, U.S. policymakers have displayed ignorance of differences 
between Sunni and Shia Islam4 – a crucial distinction especially needed for understanding 
Iran, a predominantly Shia country.  Additionally, as Vali Nasr notes, “neither Shia nor 
Sunni beliefs and views of each other are monolithic.”5  Scholars and policymakers 
should recognize that Iran’s version of Shiism, which allows for clerics to rule under the 
concept of velayat-e faqih, differs from other interpretations of Shiism, including the 
quietist version held by Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani.6   
Moreover, while area studies scholars display a deep knowledge of Iran’s history, 
ideology, and religion, their work sometimes fails to incorporate revolutionary and 
international relations theories.  Conversely, theorists are often seemingly uninterested in 
applying their ideas to area studies.  This thesis argues that scholars and policymakers 
must pursue a holistic understanding of Iran by combining a variety of scholarship, 
including area studies and theory.  
This thesis portfolio examines a variety of area studies scholarship relating to 
Iran, particularly focusing on scholarship that explains Iran’s foreign policy and internal 
                                                                          
4 Jeff Stein, “Can You Tell a Sunni From a Shiite?”  The New York Times, October 17, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/opinion/17stein.html?pagewanted=all (accessed August 5, 2012). 
 
5 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc., 2007 and 2006), 58. 
 
6 Ibid., 125, 142, 145.  
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stability.  Several schools of thought on Iranian foreign policy exist.  First, some scholars 
argue that Iran seeks to rise as a regional hegemon.  For example, Nasr asserts, “Since 
2003 Iran has shown a more confident but also military strident face as it has rebuffed 
international efforts to stop its nuclear program and asserted its claim to regional 
power.”7  Moreover, Nasr argues that the fall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s 
government enabled Iran to obtain increased influence in the region.8  Second, multiple 
scholars assert that Iran is a rational actor whose foreign policies are driven by 
pragmatism.  A report from several RAND analysts summarizes this view: “Our 
exploration of Iranian strategic thinking revealed that ideology and bravado frequently 
mask a preference for opportunism and realpolitik–the qualities that define ‘normal’ state 
behavior.”9   
Third, scholars seem to agree that Shiism plays a role in Iranian foreign policy, 
but disagree on the extent of that role.  For example, some see Shiism as a driving force 
behind Iran’s nuclear program.  Mehdi Khalaji contends that former Iranian president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a part of an apocalyptic secret society that may have 
jurisdiction over Iran’s nuclear program.  The group believes that the Hidden Imam, a 
figure in Shia Islam, will return more quickly via the use of advanced technology.10  
Additionally, Jeffrey Haynes asserts, “Many argue that a religious component underpins 
                                                                          
7 Ibid., 268. 
 
8 Ibid., 222. 
 
9 Frederic Wehrey et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the 
Middle East (RAND: Santa Monica, 2009), p. xiii-xiv. 
 
10 Mehdi Khalaji, Apocalyptic Politics: On the Rationality of Iranian Policy (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 2008), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus79Final.pdf (accessed August 12, 
2012), vii. 
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Iran's nuclear programme [sic], which allegedly grows out of an apocalyptic vision 
envisaging widespread devastation or ultimate doom.”11  However, scholars like Shahram 
Chubin12 and Gawdat Bahgat13 see Iran’s nuclear program as driven by pragmatic 
objectives such as a desire for regional influence.  This thesis explores these schools of 
thought, arguing that Iran is seeking to obtain greater influence in the region, and that 
Shiism’s influence on Iranian foreign policy is secondary to matters of pragmatism. 
 Although area studies scholars have contributed to a body of literature on Iran’s 
foreign policy behavior, scholarship on Iran’s internal stability is limited.  Scholars who 
have considered the topic usually agree that Iran will not experience a revolution in the 
near future.  For instance, Jack A. Goldstone14 outlines a variety of factors he believes 
contributes to Iran’s internal stability, including the existence of multiple, strong leaders; 
the pro-regime Basij and Revolutionary Guards; and widespread approval of regime 
ideologies.15  Similarly, Nikkie Keddie asserts that Iran’s Persian identity will likely 
prevent the Arab Spring from inspiring a revolution in Iran.16  One voice of dissent is 
                                                                          
11 Jeffrey Haynes, “Religion and Foreign Policy Making in the USA, India and Iran: towards a research agenda,” Third 
World Quarterly 29 no. 1 (2008): 160. 
 
12 Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 8, 
16.  
 
13 Gawdat Bahgat, “Iran and the United States:  The Emerging Security Paradigm in the Middle East,” Parameters 
(summer 2006): 5-18, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/07summer/bahgat.htm (accessed August 11, 2012). 
 
14 Although Jack Goldstone’s views are included in this section, he should not be considered an area studies scholar. 
 
15 Jack A. Goldstone, "Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies," 
Foreign Affairs 90 (May/June 2011): n.p. 
 




Jonathan Powell, who argues: “The Iranians have been helping the Syrians with their 
techniques of suppression.  Once the young people of Iran see that those methods do not 
work and that the corrupt Assad regime can be overthrown, they will feel emboldened to 
take up their unfinished revolution once again.”17  Additionally, when modernization and 
structural revolutionary theory is applied to the situation in Iran, regime stability seems 
less than certain.  
To understand Iran’s nuclear program and its regional ambitions, this thesis also 
examines a variety of international relations theories, such as realism (including classical 
realism, neorealism, the realist offense-defense theory, and the hegemonic stability 
theory), liberalism, and constructivism.  The thesis seeks to combine these theories with 
area studies to provide an informed perspective on Iran.   
Chapter One 
 
This thesis portfolio explores various topics relating to Iran’s behavior in the 
international, regional, and national spheres.  Chapter one examines Iran’s international 
behavior by analyzing U.S.-Iran relations in the context of Iran’s nuclear program.  In 
particular, this chapter aims to discover which policies could most successfully curb or 
slow Iran’s nuclear program.  First, the chapter considers uses two major international 
theories – realism and liberalism – to shed light on Iran’s nuclear program and U.S. 
policy considerations.  Both realists and liberals tend to view the current international 
system as unipolar, with the United States holding the position of the world’s hegemon.  
However, realists anticipate that weaker states will restore the balance of power and end 
the current unipolar configuration.  In contrast, liberals believe that if the United States 
                                                                          
17 Jonathan Powell, "A Lasting Glow: Seizing the Optimism of the Arab Spring," Public Policy Research 18 (December-
February 2012): 208. 
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exercises its power judiciously via institutions and partnerships, it could prolong its 
hegemonic status.   
Throughout the chapter, realist and liberal concepts are used to explain the 
motives driving Iran’s nuclear program and interpret U.S. policy options.  The chapter 
argues that Iran’s nuclear program is motivated at least partially by a sense of insecurity, 
which was exacerbated by the United States’ increased presence in the region during the 
1990s.  Thus, when negotiating with Iran regarding its nuclear program, the United States 
should try to address security concerns and reassure the nation.  Moreover, the United 
States should act multilaterally when possible, as this increases legitimacy, lessens the 
likelihood that countries like Iran will feel threatened by unilateral displays of U.S. 
power, and buttresses the U.S.’s status as the world’s hegemon. 
Second, this chapter provides an overview of the Iranian nuclear program.  
Evidence presented in this section demonstrates that Iran has a uranium enrichment 
program and seeks a self-sustaining nuclear fuel cycle.  While Iran’s intentions regarding 
nuclear weapons are difficult to determine, Iran’s behavior is worrisome, especially 
considering that the IAEA cannot determine whether “all nuclear material in Iran is in 
peaceful activities.”18  In addition, the chapter disagrees with neorealist scholar Kenneth 
Waltz’s view of nuclear weapons – particularly the notion that an Iranian bomb would be 
a positive development for the region.  If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, it will likely 
not use the weapon except as a last resort.  However, because a nuclear weapon would 
                                                                          
18 International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of 
Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 21, 2013, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-6.pdf (accessed March 17, 2014), 12. 
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increase Iran’s international leverage, the United States should attempt to prevent Iran 
from developing such a weapon.  
Finally, this chapter considers U.S. policy options towards Iran, including 
traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, and sanctions.  Ultimately, this chapter argues 
that the United States should maintain engagement with Iran by participating in 
multilateral nuclear talks, support reform in Iran by increasing public diplomacy, and 
demonstrate disapproval of Iran’s nuclear program by continuing sanctions unless a 
favorable agreement is reached.  The United States should continue efforts to levy 
sanctions via international institutions, as multilateral sanctions will likely have a greater 
impact than those levied unilaterally.  These policies should help address the threat of 
Iran’s nuclear program while also promoting a judicious use of U.S. power. 
Chapter Two 
 
 Chapter two considers how Iran’s Shia identity influences the nation’s regional 
foreign policy posture.  To understand Iran as a regional actor, the chapter begins by 
considering two international relations theories: neorealism and constructivism.  This 
chapter argues that neorealism’s balance of power concept could be useful for 
understanding the Middle East, but the theory’s exclusive focus on state behavior 
prevents the theory from aligning with current regional power dynamics.  Constructivism 
helps scholars understand the important role of identity and state interest in the Middle 
East, but unlike realism, does not provide insight into how scholars can ascertain state 
intentions.  This chapter argues that neorealism should be modified or discarded in favor 
of a theory that recognizes sectarian forces and non-state groups as elements of the 
balance of power equation.  Although Middle Eastern conflicts are not always related to 
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Sunni and Shia dynamics, Sunni and Shia Islam’s polarizing influence in the Middle East 
is significant and should be recognized by international relations theory.   
Next, chapter two considers how Shiism influences major policy objectives of 
Iran, including its hegemonic goals, relations with Iraq, nuclear capabilities, and support 
of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.  This section argues that Shiism’s impact on 
these policies varies depending on whether Iran is relating to other Shia communities or 
appealing to a broader, Sunni audience.  Nonetheless, pragmatism, rather than Shiism, 
seems to be the primary driver of Iran’s major foreign policy decisions. 
Chapter Three 
 
 Finally, chapter three considers the national topic of Iranian regime stability.  
This chapter seeks to answer three questions relating to Iran’s regime.  First, will Iran 
remain stable under its current system of government?  Second, will its regime be 
challenged by social unrest or possibly overturned?  Third, is it even possible to predict 
Iran’s future?  To explore these questions, the chapter adopts Theda Skocpol’s definition 
of revolutions as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures . . . 
accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below.”19   
The chapter begins by examining scholarship relating to Iran’s regime stability, 
which tends to view Iran’s regime as stable.  Next, the chapter analyzes revolutionary 
theories that could help scholars more accurately predict revolutions, especially if 
combined with area scholarship focused on historical and religious factors.  Specifically, 
modernization theory suggests that scholars should evaluate the nation’s economy when 
considering whether a nation is vulnerable to revolt.  According to this theory, Iran’s poor 
                                                                          
19 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4. 
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economic conditions could possibly lead to a revolution, but rapid economic expansion 
could also cause instability.  Next, structural theory should prompt scholars to evaluate 
strengths and weaknesses present in a nation’s government.  This theory indicates that 
Iran’s regime could be unstable due to the existence of Iranian opposition groups and 
Iran’s highly competitive relationships with several other nations.      
 Finally, this chapter challenges the assumption, made by a majority of scholars, 
that Iran’s regime is durable and will remain in power for the foreseeable future.  
Although additional research needs to be conducted on Iranian regime stability, current 
evidence suggests that Iran’s regime could be vulnerable to a future revolution.  
Nonetheless, the chapter cautions that a revolution in Iran might not be a positive 
development for U.S.-Iran relations.  As Jack Goldstone argues, “. . . revolutions have 
often resulted in the exchange of one set of problems . . . for another set of problems.”20    
 This thesis portfolio emphasizes that policymaking and scholarship relating to 
Iran should be grounded in a solid understanding of area studies.  International relations 
and revolutionary theory also provide a framework for understanding Iran, as they 
provide important insights into state behavior and regime stability.  However, these 
theories should not be taken in a vacuum, but instead be combined with a firm grasp of 
area studies.  Ultimately, if scholars and policymakers develop a more holistic 
understanding of Iran’s behavior, they should be better equipped to recommend and enact 
policies that will improve the United States’ relationship with Iran.  
                                                                          
20 Jack A. Goldstone, ed., Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1986), 321.  
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Chapter 1: U.S. Foreign Policy and Iran’s Nuclear Pursuits 
 
Iran has pursued controversial foreign policy objectives since becoming an 
Islamic Republic21 in 1979.22  From the United States’ perspective as articulated by the 
2010 United States National Security Strategy, “. . . the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
endangered the security of the region and the United States and failed to live up to its 
international responsibilities.”  The National Security Strategy identifies several topics of 
concern to the United States: Iran's nuclear ambitions, sponsorship of terrorism, 
subversion of Israel-Palestine peace, and human rights record.23  U.S. foreign policy 
toward Iran was further complicated by Iran's former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
whose hardline stance toward the United States24 was a departure from the more 
accommodating policies of the previous president, Mohammad Khatami.25  The U.S.’s 
relationship with Iran continues to be a crucial policy issue, especially considering Iran’s 
participation in nuclear talks under the new leadership of President Hassan Rouhani.26   
In light of these challenges and developments, this chapter examines various 
foreign policy options the United States could adopt toward Iran.  Because Iran’s nuclear 
program is a particularly difficult and salient issue for U.S. policymakers, the chapter 
                                                                          
21 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, ed., Iran's Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad (Berkshire: 
Ithaca Press, 2008), vii. 
 
22 Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 16.   
 
23 President of the United States, “National Security Strategy,” The White House, May 2010, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed October 27, 2012), 26. 
 
24 Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Democracy Promotion versus Engagement with Iran,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 3 
(August 2011): 475. 
25 Ibid., 472. 
26 Martin Baron and Anne Gearan, “Rouhani Says Iran has ‘serious will’ to make a deal on nuclear program,” The 
Washington Post, January 23, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/rouhani-says-iran-has-serious-will-to-make-a-deal-on-
nuclear-program/2014/01/23/eb4ae534-843c-11e3-8099-9181471f7aaf_story.html (accessed January 30, 2014).   
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seeks to determine which U.S. policies would most effectively slow or halt the Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions.  First, this chapter introduces two prominent international relations 
theories, and subsequently uses these theories to interpret Iran’s behavior and inform U.S. 
policymaking.  In order to provide context for analyzing policy options, this chapter next 
presents an overview of Iran’s nuclear program.  Third, this chapter will assess various 
policy options, including traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, sanctions, and 
combined policy approaches.  Also considered is the pessimist position that the United 
States may not be able to halt Iran's nuclear ambitions.   
This chapter concurs with the realist assertion that Iran is unlikely to use a nuclear 
weapon offensively.  However, it argues that preventing Iran from developing a nuclear 
weapon will further U.S. interests.  This chapter also asserts that while U.S. policies may 
not thwart Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, the United States should adopt a 
multi-policy approach as long as the possibility of prevention exists.  A review of 
relevant literature reveals that most scholars’ policy recommendations are unnecessarily 
narrow.  A multi-policy approach can be employed when policy options are not viewed 
as mutually exclusive, but instead are seen as various means to achieve a common end.  
In particular, the United States should employ a mix of engagement, public diplomacy, 
and sanctions aimed at tempering the Iranian regime.  The United States should continue 
engagement attempts with Iran, rewarding compliance with the carrot of reduced 
sanctions.27  However, the United States and the international community should refuse 
                                                                          
27 On February 3, 2014, White House officials informed a Senate panel of the continued existence of international 
sanctions.  Treasury Department undersecretary David Cohen said that “if these talks turn into deals that violate the elaborate 
sanctions that remain in place . . . we will take action . . .” See Paul Richter, “Iran Sanctions Remain Despite Nuclear Deal, U.S. 
Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-congress-
20140205,0,5032344.story#axzz2sV7JR5hI (accessed February 5, 2014). 
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to remove all sanctions unless a significant, comprehensive agreement is reached.  
Moreover, whenever possible, the United States should seek to act multilaterally and 
utilize international institutions, as such actions can help maintain the United States’ 
position of power in the international system. 
International Relations Theory and U.S.-Iran Relations 
 
In order to understand the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program and determine 
how the United States should respond, scholars and policymakers should consider 
insights contained in international relations theories.  This section will examine two 
major international relations theories – realism and liberalism.  Subsequently, the paper 
will use principles from those theories to better understand Iran’s behavior and suggest 
effective policies towards Iran.28   
An alternate approach could examine policy options in light of historic U.S. 
foreign policy.  For instance, scholars and policymakers could consider George 
Washington’s Farewell Address of 1795, in which Washington warned against foreign 
entanglements.29  Abraham Lincoln, likewise, resisted foreign entanglements by 
managing to prevent Europe from supporting the Confederacy.30  While these concepts 
were certainly important for a fledgling nation, the United States’ present role as a world 
hegemon necessitates that the nation take a different course.  As Robert W. Tucker and 
David C. Hendrickson argue, Washington’s “‘great rule of conduct’ was not set forth as 
                                                                          
28 A third major international relations theory, constructivism, will be discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. 
 
29 “Washington’s Farewell Address 1796,” Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp 
(accessed May 4, 2014). 
 
30 Kevin Peraino, Lincoln in the World: The Making of a Statesman and the Dawn of American Power (New York: Crown 
Publishing Group, 2013), n.p. 
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an absolute principle that represented, whatever the circumstances, the timeless interests 
of the nation, but as a policy for a state of only modest power that was consolidating a 
newly won independence and a still precarious security.”31  Given the United States’ 
current position in the world, international relations theories will have more applicability 
to the problems contemporary scholars and policymakers face.  
Realist scholar Stephen Walt identifies the importance of international relations 
theory in the context of policymaking: “Everyone uses theories – whether he or she 
knows it or not – and disagreements about policy usually rest on more fundamental 
disagreements about basic forces that shape international forces.”32  Jack Snyder argues 
that international theories are most helpful in “providing the vocabulary and conceptual 
framework to ask hard questions of those who think that changing the world is easy.”33  
Snyder suggests that while theories have weaknesses, policymakers need not view 
insights from theories as mutually exclusive.  He states, “In lieu of a good theory of 
change, the most prudent course is to use the insights of each . . . as a check on the 
irrational exuberance of the others.”34   
Realism 
 
Stephen Walt explains that realism “depicts international affairs as a struggle for 
power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for 
                                                                          
31 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, “Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 9, no. 
2 (spring 1990): 147. 
 
32 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1998): 29. 
 
33 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy (November 1, 2004), 





eliminating conflict and war.”35  According to realist scholar John Mearsheimer, realism 
emphasizes the following five assumptions: the anarchic nature of the international 
system; the ability of states to militarily attack one another; the uncertain nature of state 
intentions; the importance of survival as a motivator of state behavior; and the fact that 
states consider how they can ensure their own survival.36   
Realism has several subsets, including classical realism, neorealism, the realist 
offense-defense theory, and the hegemonic stability theory.  Classical realism asserts that 
states are driven to war because of their inherent propensity toward domination.37  
According to another subset of realism, the realist offense-defense theory, peace is more 
likely to occur when states are able to defend themselves.  Walt explains, “For these 
‘defensive’ realists, states merely sought to survive and great powers could guarantee 
their security by balancing alliances and choosing defensive military postures (such as 
retaliatory nuclear forces).”38  Realism also offers differing views on hegemonic powers.  
In one variation, a hegemonic power is considered threatening because it can attempt to 
control other states.  However, according to the hegemonic stability theory, a hegemonic 
state can use its power to enforce peace.39  
                                                                          
35 Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 31. 
 
36 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 
1994/1995): 10. 
 
37 T.V. Paul, “Regional Transformation in International Relations,” in International Relations Theory and Regional 
Transformation, ed. T.V. Paul, 3-21 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7. 
 
38 Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 31. 
 
39 Paul, 8. 
 
 15 
 Amongst realism’s contributions to international relations, two related topics 
stand out: the balance of power theory and the concept of hegemony.40  Neorealism 
emphasizes the tendency of less powerful states to try to balance stronger states,41 which 
is considered necessary for maintaining regional stability.42  States engage in balancing 
behavior to prevent hegemony, “a situation in which one state amasses so much power 
that it is able to dominate the rest of the states in the system, which would put an end to 
the multistate system.”43   
Many scholars assert that the current international system is unipolar, with the 
United States holding the position as the world’s dominant power.44  A variety of 
evidence demonstrates that this is the case: the United States has the largest military in 
the world, a more powerful navy than the rest of the world’s navies combined, and 
defense expenditures that equal nearly fifty percent of all military spending worldwide.45  
According to Kenneth N. Waltz, a unipolar system is the least resilient arrangement for 
two primary reasons.  First, the predominant state tends to overextend itself and 
ultimately weakens its own power.  Evidence of overextension can be seen in the United 
States’ recent foreign policy choices – for instance, U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
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have stretched the nation’s resources.46  Second, “even if a dominant power behaves with 
moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. 
. . . Faced with unbalanced power, some states try to increase their own strength or they 
ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance.”47  
Under the balance of power concept, weaker states should balance against the 
United States and end the current system of unipolarity.  Snyder, however, asserts that 
“no combination of states or other powers can challenge the United States militarily, and 
no balancing coalition is imminent.”48   Nonetheless, both Russia and China seem to be 
rising powers.49  Additionally, realism’s balance of power concept could be valid even if 
countries currently lack the ability to challenge the United States.  As Kenneth Waltz 
argues, “realist theory predicts that balances disrupted will one day be restored,” but the 
theory is limited because “it cannot say when.”50  Moreover, Waltz explains that while 
balancing within the international system usually occurs, it is not inevitable.51  Even so, 
the current system, which has remained unipolar since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
appears to be more resilient than it should be if it is truly the least stable arrangement.52  
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 An alternate explanation advanced by liberal theories posits that institutional 
structures influence whether states need to engage in balancing.  Ikenberry explains that 
under this school of thought, “American hegemonic power is rendered more acceptable to 
others because of the dense institutional structures in which it is situated.”53  Conversely, 
states could attempt to balance U.S. power via international institutions.  The behavior of 
Germany and France toward the United States seems to support this argument.  As 
Snyder notes, “these states have tried to undermine U.S. moral legitimacy and constrain 
the superpower in a web of multilateral institutions and treaty regimes –not what standard 
realist theory predicts.”54   
Liberalism 
 
 Liberal ideas can be seen as emanating from the Enlightenment, when thinkers 
believed the world could be improved through reason.55  According to Robert O. 
Keohane, liberalism is defined as follows:  
. . . an approach to the analysis of social reality that (1) begins with individuals as 
the relevant actors, (2) seeks to understand how aggregations of individuals make 
collective decisions and how organizations composed to individuals interact, and 
(3) embeds this analysis in a world view that emphasizes individual rights and 
adopts an ameliorative view of progress in human affairs.56   
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Keohane outlines several subsets of liberalism: commercial liberalism, which emphasizes 
trade; regulatory liberalism, which focuses on the importance of institutions and rules; 
and republican liberalism, which asserts the peaceful nature of republics.57   
One of liberalism’s key strengths is the concept of democratic peace theory, or the 
idea that democracies do not fight amongst themselves.  Snyder calls this concept the 
“the closest thing we have to an iron law in social science.”58  According to liberal 
scholar Michael Doyle, “Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous 
wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war 
with one another.”59  Similarly, in his 1795 work, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Sketch, Immanuel Kant argues that nations with Republican constitutions are more likely 
to be peaceful, as citizens of these nations will be inclined to regard war cautiously.60   
 However, as a result of this notion, liberal nations may be inclined to engage in 
conflicts with nonliberal states in attempts to spread democracy.  Snyder explains: “. . . 
Michael W. Doyle’s articles on democratic peace warned that, though democracies never 
fight each other, they are prone to launch messianic struggles against warlike 
authoritarian regimes to ‘make the world safe for democracy.’”61  In addition, attempts to 
“make the world safe for democracy” can backfire, as recent world events have 
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demonstrated.  For example, many scholars argue that the United States’ efforts to 
establish a democracy in Iraq led to an unplanned outcome: due to the vacuum created by 
forcefully removing Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian regime, the regional balance of 
power in the Middle East shifted, allowing Iran to take more aggressive steps towards 
attaining regional hegemony. 
  In addition to democratic peace theory, another potential strength of liberalism is 
its positive view of institutions.  Keohane defines institutional liberalism as “the view that 
cooperation in world politics can be enhanced through the construction and support of 
multilateral institutions based on liberal principles.”62  In contrast, realist scholars tend to 
have a negative view towards international institutions.63  As Mearsheimer argues, 
“Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power 
in the world.  They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and 
they have no independent effect on state behavior.  Realists therefore believe that 
institutions are not an important cause of peace.”64  However, John Gerard Ruggie points 
out that institutions have actually enhanced international security in a variety of ways.  
For example, during Eisenhower’s presidency, realists disparaged nuclear 
nonproliferation agreements.  Yet, problematic countries such as South Africa, Brazil, 
and Argentina have since determined not to develop nuclear weapons, which indicates 
that nonproliferation efforts have had at least some success.65   
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Realism, Liberalism, and Policymaking 
 
 Realism and liberalism provide different interpretations of three important 
concepts: polarity, balancing, and institutions.  Understanding these concepts is crucial 
because they hold implications for policymaking and the United States’ overarching 
foreign policy strategy.66  While theorists from both camps tend to agree that the current 
system is unipolar, realists expect the current configuration to end when weaker states 
balance against U.S. power.  Realist principles suggest that, in the meantime, the United 
States should avoiding weakening its hegemonic status by overextending itself 
internationally.  In addition, the United States should avoid actions that could accelerate 
the balancing process, such as exuberant displays of power.  Waltz warns: “The United 
States cannot prevent a new balance of power from forming.  It can hasten its coming as 
it has been earnestly doing.”67  Realism also suggests that policymakers should place less 
emphasis on institutions, as they merely reflect existing power equations.   
In contrast, liberals believe that by properly exercising power in the context of 
institutions and partnerships, the United States can prolong its international influence.68  
As Ikenberry and Kupchan argue, “a dominant America that reassures others and deploys 
its power to secure public goods induces systemic stability . . .” 69  This type of behavior 
differs sharply from the foreign policy agenda pursued by the George W. Bush 
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administration, which attempted to preclude balancing by increasing U.S. projections of 
power.  However, Ikenberry and Kupchan assert that this strategy actually prompts other 
states to balance against the United States.70 
 As Jack Snyder suggests, realism and liberalism have both strengths and 
weaknesses.  Because one theory alone is insufficient to explain Iran’s behavior and 
inform policy options, this chapter borrows from both theories.  Having identified the 
central tenants of realism and liberalism, the following section will consider Iran’s 
nuclear program in light of these theories to gain greater insight into Iran’s possible 
motivations.  
Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 
Historical Background of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 
In order to determine what policies the United States should adopt toward Iran, it 
is essential to consider the background and scope of Iran’s nuclear program.  This section 
will examine the history of Iran’s nuclear program, consider Iran’s nuclear capabilities, 
and analyze Iran’s intentions regarding developing a nuclear weapon.  While conducting 
this analysis, this section will also draw upon international relations theory to explain 
Iran’s actions.  Iran’s nuclear program started in the mid-1960s under Iran’s former 
monarchy.71  In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),72 a United 
Nations treaty that advances nuclear disarmament and allows countries to pursue peaceful 
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nuclear energy programs.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a safeguard 
established by the treaty, conducts inspections to ensure treaty compliance.73  In 1974, 
Iran displayed an interest in nuclear technology by founding the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran.74  Iran’s nuclear program resumed in the mid-1980s, likely as a 
response to chemical weapons used by Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.75  Several factors may 
have helped accelerate Iran’s nuclear program: first, Iraq’s nuclear program was revealed 
during the 1991 Gulf War;76 and second, after this war, the United States expanded its 
regional presence.77   
Iran’s choice to restart its nuclear program appears to have been motivated by a 
sense of insecurity and a desire to protect itself from future attacks – behavior anticipated 
by the theory of realism.78  As mentioned earlier, Mearsheimer identifies survival as the 
fundamental driver of state behavior and a key tenet of realism.79  Likewise, according to 
Ikenberry, realism’s balance of power concept dictates that “security – indeed survival – 
is the fundamental goal of states, and because states cannot ultimately rely on 
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commitments or guarantees to ensure their security, states will be very sensitive to their 
relative power position.”80  Moreover, the United States’ expanding regional presence 
likely increased Iran’s feelings of insecurity, thus prompting the nation to hasten its 
nuclear efforts.  Iran’s behavior was consistent with realist expectations for a weaker state 
acting in a unipolar system, especially when that state feels threatened by the global 
hegemon. 
Concerns regarding security and survival likely continued to influence Iran’s 
nuclear program.  In 2000, Iran started testing nuclear enrichment centrifuges it obtained 
from the A.Q. Khan network in the mid-1990s.81  A.Q. Khan was involved with 
Pakistan’s nuclear program and internationally distributed nuclear information and 
materials.82  Iran started constructing Nantanz, its primary nuclear enrichment facility, in 
2001.83  A representative from an Iranian dissident group, the National Council of 
Resistance of Iran (NCRI), exposed Iran’s nuclear program in an August 2002 press 
conference.84  In 2003, Iran’s facilities were inspected by the IAEA, who found weapons-
grade uranium (WGU).85  Also in 2003, Iran agreed to halt its enrichment program after 
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being persuaded by Britain, France, and Germany (the EU3).86  Greg Bruno notes that 
this decision was spurred by international pressure directed towards Iran.87       
According to a 2007 National Intelligence Assessment, Iran likely had a nuclear 
weapons program until the fall of 2003, when the program was at least partially 
suspended.  This document also assessed “with moderate confidence” that as of mid-
2007, Iran had not resumed the development of nuclear weapons.88  However, analysis 
from British intelligence indicates that Iran restarted weaponization activities after 
pausing these efforts in 2003.  Additionally, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected 
president in 2005, the EU3-Iran agreement ended.89  Also in 2005, Iran indicated that it 
was restarting uranium conversion activities.90  According to the IAEA, in December 
2011, Iran started enriching uranium at its Fordow facility.91   
Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities 
 
In addition to Iran’s uranium enrichment program, Iran has aspirations for a self-
sustaining nuclear fuel cycle.92  Iran’s uranium mining facilities are located at Saghand, 
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as well as the Gchine mine near Bandar Abbas.  However, Iran’s uranium mining efforts 
may not be able to sustain a commercial nuclear reactor.93  After Iran produces uranium 
yellowcake via mining, it converts the yellowcake to uranium hexafluoride gas at its 
Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan.94  Iran’s Nantanz Fuel Enrichment Plant 
produces low-enriched uranium (LEU) hexafluoride, and the IAEA monitors the 
centrifuges and nuclear material at the facility.95  According to a February 2013 IAEA 
report, Iran produced 8,271 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 5 percent U-235, 
as well as 280 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 20 percent U-235.96  A report 
from the Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy assessed that if Iran 
enriched the uranium at its Nantanz facility to WGU, it could produce more than six 
nuclear weapons.97  
Since Iran possesses the ability to produce reactor fuel, it could theoretically 
produce WGU.98  In a Congressional Research Service report, Paul K. Kerr expressed 
concern over Iran constructing uranium enrichment facilities with gas centrifuges.  Gas 
centrifuges could produce either nuclear power reactor fuel (LEU) or highly enriched 
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uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.99  According to RAND’s Robert J. Reardon, 
“Because the fuel cycle can be used for both purposes, the United States has long 
opposed Iran’s possession of it, and has focused its efforts on denying Iran this 
capability.”100  Experts are also concerned that Iran might covertly construct a uranium 
enrichment plant.101  Furthermore, even though the IAEA monitors Iran’s declared 
facilities, the IAEA “is unable to provide credible assurances about the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all 
nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.”102  
In addition to Iran’s uranium enrichment program, the country has sought 
plutonium production capabilities.  According to Reardon, Iran is not currently able to 
produce weapons-grade plutonium.  Although a heavy water reactor under construction at 
Arak could produce weapons-grade plutonium, this reactor was not yet complete at the 
time of Reardon’s assessment.103  Iran could extract plutonium from spent fuel obtained 
from its Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which was constructed by Russia.  Although Iran 
was supposed to return spent fuel to Russia, the nation has since stated that discharged 
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fuel is being stored at the site.  While Iran is not considered currently able to reprocess 
the fuel, it may develop the capability to do so in the future.104 
Iran’s missile capacities are an important part of its nuclear capabilities, since Iran 
would deliver nuclear weapons (if it possessed them) via ballistic missiles.105  In a U.S. 
Intelligence threat assessment, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper expressed 
concern over Iran’s missile capabilities, including the possibility that Iran may want to 
develop an intercontinental ballistic missile: “Iran already has the largest inventory of 
ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and 
sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal.”  Furthermore, Clapper assessed Iran’s 
ballistic missiles as being able to deliver weapons of mass destruction.106  Similarly, a 
2012 Department of Defense report stated, “Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles 
that can range regional adversaries, Israel, and Eastern Europe, including an extended-
range variant of the Shahb-3 and a 2,000-km medium-range ballistic missile, the 
Ashura.”  The report assessed that Iran could test an intercontinental ballistic missile by 
2015, if it received foreign support.107  According to a Congressional Research Service 
report, U.S. intelligence reports consider Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles to be 
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“inherently capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.”108  However, experts disagree about 
the status of Iran’s missile program,109 and some argue that U.S. assessments present 
worst-case scenarios.110  Furthermore, according to Reardon, “Iran would need to 
overcome several technical challenges to construct a functioning implosion warhead that 
could be effectively mated to one of Iran’s ballistic missile designs.”111  Thus, Iran’s 
ability to actually deliver a nuclear weapon, should it produce one, remains unclear.  
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions  
 
 Although Iran has pursued a nuclear program for fuel purposes, the country’s 
intentions regarding nuclear weapons have historically been difficult to assess.  In 2012, 
Clapper indicated that Iran’s intention to produce nuclear weapons was unknown, but 
stated that the nation possessed a high capability to produce such weapons.  Thus, 
according to Clapper, the primary question was whether Iran intended to do so.112  
Clapper provided a similar assessment in a 2013 statement to the U.S. Senate’s 
Committee on Armed Services.  He noted that the decision to produce nuclear weapons 
would likely fall to Iran’s supreme leader, but specified that Khamenei’s intentions were 
                                                                          
108 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, by 
Steven A. Hildreth, CRS Report R42849 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, December 6, 2012), 
n.p. 
 
109 Reardon, 39-40 
  
110 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, 37. 
 
111 Reardon, 55. 
 
112 James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012, http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf (accessed 
November 11, 2012), 5-6. 
 
 29 
unknown.113  Clapper also indicated in 2013 that even though Iran’s technical capabilities 
have become more advanced, it “could not divert safeguarded material and produce a 
weapon-worth of WGU before this activity is discovered.”114   
Statements from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, when taken at face 
value, suggest that Iran has been uninterested in obtaining a nuclear weapon.  For 
example, in 2012, Khamenei was quoted as stating,  “The Iranian nation has never sought 
and will never seek nuclear weapons and will prove to the world that a nuclear weapon is 
not a source of power . . .”115  In a similar, but somewhat contradictory claim, Khamenei 
said, “We do not have nuclear weapons, and we do not intend to produce them.  But in 
the face of aggression, either by the U.S. or the Zionist regime, we will attack them at the 
same level that they attack us . . .”116  However, a 2012 report from the IAEA challenged 
the validity of Khamenei’s statements, which may have been attempts to conceal the 
country’s nuclear intentions.  According to the science journal Nature, the IAEA “report 
suggests that the country [Iran] is working towards a relatively sophisticated device that 
could fit on board a medium-range ballistic missile – making it much more difficult to 
intercept and destroy than one delivered by an aeroplane [sic].”117  Moreover, Ray 
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Takeyh asserts that according to large amounts of evidence, Iran has been deceptive 
about “its development of dual-use nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.”118  Thus, at the very 
least, the United States should consider Iran’s nuclear program to be a potential security 
concern.  
However, not all scholars consider a nuclear-armed Iran to be cause for 
trepidation.  Drawing from realist balance of power arguments, Waltz explains that as the 
Middle East’s sole nuclear power, Israel is the cause of regional volatility.  He contends 
that “the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent 
Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear 
crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored.”119  Furthermore, 
Waltz argues that an Iranian bomb would lead to “a Middle East that is more stable than 
it is today.”120   
Walt, in contrast, argues that “Waltz is too sanguine about the pacifying effects of 
nuclear weapons in this context and . . . discounts the other risks associated with nuclear 
spread (including questions of custody and authority).”121  As Walt suggests, a nuclear-
armed Iran is not necessarily good for the region, nor is it beneficial for U.S. interests.  A 
nuclear weapon could allow Iran to obtain increased legitimacy, status, and regional 
power.  In addition, it could further the survival of a regime that opposes the United 
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States and its ally Israel, and supports Hezbollah and Hamas, groups listed by the U.S. 
State Department as foreign terrorist organizations.122  Furthermore, an Iranian hegemon 
in the Middle East would likely be a detriment to U.S. interests in the region, including 
the United States’ energy needs.  If Iran is allowed to gain power in the region, the nation 
may also challenge the influence of Saudi Arabia, a country with key diplomatic ties to 
the United States and an important source of oil.  Finally, a nuclear Iran would likely 
impact how the United States relates to the nation on the international stage, possibly 
requiring the United States to treat the nation with increased deference and caution.  
Therefore, the United States and should work toward crafting policies designed to 
mitigate Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
Rouhani’s Election 
 
The 2013 election of Hassan Rouhani to Iran’s presidency could change the 
course of Iran’s nuclear program.123  Rouhani may have altered the power dynamics in 
Iran by influencing Iran’s nuclear policy, a realm previously assessed as belonging to 
Khamenei.  Mahmood Monshirpouri and Manochehr Dorraj argue that Rouhani 
disproved conventional wisdom by showing that that a president was “able to persuade 
ruling clerics and the Revolutionary Guards . . . to yield to a conciliatory political 
course.”124  In November 2013, Iran agreed to a P5+1 (United States, Russia, China, 
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Germany, Britain and France) six-month interim agreement, which would ease certain 
international sanctions directed toward Iran if the nation froze various elements of its 
nuclear program.  Meanwhile, the ultimate goal remains a comprehensive, long-term 
agreement between Iran and the P5+1.125  While the results of these negotiations have yet 
to be seen, the interim agreement represents a positive step in U.S.-Iran relations.  The 
multilateral nature of these negotiations is also promising.  As liberal theory suggests, the 
United States should seek to act multilaterally whenever possible, as this can provide the 
United States with increased legitimacy and effectiveness.126  Thomas G. Weiss asserts, 
“By renewing multilateral leadership, the United States can more effectively pursue its 
own interests while helping lay the foundations for future efforts to address global 
problems and help others.”127   
In addition, Rouhani’s apparent willingness to negotiate could indicate that Iran 
currently considers the economic promise of sanctions relief, rather than the security and 
prestige associated with nuclear weapons, to be the best way of furthering its interests.  
According to liberal theory, states act to preserve their own interests, but perceptions of 
these interests can shift over time.  Robert Keohane argues that liberalism “does not 
accept a static view of self-interest, but rather holds open the possibility that people will 
change their attitudes and loyalties.”128 
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Even if negotiations fail, the worst-case scenario – nuclear weapon use by Iran – 
is unlikely to occur.  As Waltz contends, Iran’s attainment of a nuclear weapon will not 
likely be catastrophic to the region, as the nation would likely act rationally with such a 
weapon.129  If Iran is a rational actor, Iran will not likely use nuclear weapons offensively 
except in cases of regime survival or as a last resort.  However, the United States should 
continue to pursue policies designed to prevent Iran from developing such weapons, since 
such a weapon would likely enhance Iran’s international standing. 
Policy Options  
 
In order to deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the United States should continue its 
attempts to slow or halt the nation’s nuclear program.  Scholars disagree on which policy 
or combination of policies the United States should adopt to achieve this objective.  Most 
scholars tend to argue that the United States should adopt traditional diplomacy, public 
diplomacy, or sanctions toward Iran.  Other scholars avoid policy recommendations, but 
instead focus on the ineffectiveness of one or more policy options.  These scholars tend to 
argue that there is no solution to Iran's nuclear ambitions.  Given the recent nuclear talks 
with Iran, these scholars may have been unnecessarily pessimistic.  However, the results 
of these negotiations are unforeseen, and Iran may still choose to carry out secret 
activities in defiance of an international agreement.  Conspicuously absent from many 
scholars' recommendations is the military option; scholars seem to agree that U.S. 
military force against Iran is either unadvisable or should only be used as a last resort.   
 
 
                                                                          





 Some scholars argue that the United States should pursue diplomacy toward Iran.  
Diplomacy can be thought of as having two parts.  In traditional diplomacy, governments 
interact with one another; whereas in public diplomacy, governments execute programs 
aimed at foreign populations.130  President Obama's initial diplomatic policies toward 
Iran131 can be characterized as attempts at traditional diplomacy.  During his presidential 
campaign, Obama expressed a willingness to meet with Iranian leadership.  He compared 
his stance, which he called “toughminded diplomacy,” with that of Ronald Reagan and 
Harry Truman.132  However, Obama's policies shifted to sanctions after Iran refused to 
negotiate on its nuclear program under the leadership of former president 
Ahmadinejad.133  Obama’s approach changed again after the election of President 
Rouhani, and he even chose to speak to Rouhani over the phone on September 27, 2013.  
This unprecedented conversation was the first of its kind since the Islamic Revolution 
was founded in 1979.134  
 Suzanne Maloney, whose article was written prior to Obama’s latest policy 
change in 2013, criticizes the Obama administration's shift from diplomacy to sanctions.  
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Maloney asserts that unrest associated with the Iranian presidential election in 2009 “did 
not formally derail the new administration’s diplomacy toward Tehran, but it surely 
shattered any expectations for quickly and durably ending the estrangement or resolving 
the increasingly urgent international concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.”135  
Maloney further explains that economic pressure, while possibly useful in convincing 
Iran to engage in talks, failed to alter Iran's security policies.136  She argues that Obama's 
administration must pursue diplomacy in order to keep Iran from becoming a nuclear 
power.137  Similarly, Nihat Ali Ozcan and Ozgur Ozdamar assert that the United States 
should use diplomatic engagement with Iran as a way to halt Iran's nuclear program.138  
Mir H. Sadat and James P. Hughes contend that the United States should engage Iran on 
the topic of Afghanistan.139  To accomplish this, they recommend allowing direct 
diplomatic engagement with Iran, facilitating talks between both countries' Kabul-based 
ambassadors,140 and including Iran in Afghanistan-related forums.141 
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 Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh believe Iran poses significant security threats to the 
United States.142  However, they think policies aimed at containing Iran will lead to 
increased Sunni extremism, much like what occurred after the 2006 war between Israel 
and Lebanon, when extreme Salafi Muslims rallied in response to Hezbollah's rise.  Sunni 
extremism, they assert, is the undesirable “ideological barrier” to Shia Iran, much like 
democracy and capitalism were counterparts to Cold War communism.143  Instead, Nasr 
and Takeyh argue for what they call “creative diplomacy” with Iran,144 in which Iran 
would be integrated into a new regional framework.  Nasr and Takeyh see Iran as a 
nation wanting to rise in power in its region, and as such, contend that Washington 
should “create a situation in which Iran will find benefit in limiting its ambitions and 
abiding by international norms.  Dialogue, compromise, and commerce, as difficult as 
they may be, are convincing means.”145  Nasr and Takeyh assert that if the United States 
and Iran restore economic and diplomatic relations and work together on Iraq, Iran may 
eventually submit to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.146    
This thesis argues that the United States should continue attempts to engage Iran 
as part of a multi-policy strategy designed to slow or halt Iran’s nuclear program.  
Engagement was less likely to succeed while Iran was under the leadership of former 
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president Mahmood Ahmadinejad, who enjoyed attracting the attention of the Arab world 
by employing vitriolic rhetoric about the United States and Israel.  However, Rouhani’s 
administration has shown openness towards dialogue and negotiation.  Rouhani is no 
stranger to negotiations; from 2003 to 2005, he served as chief nuclear negotiator during 
the time Iran agreed to a uranium enrichment freeze.  However, Rouhani’s presidency 
should not be heralded as a definite end to the threat of Iran’s nuclear program.  
According to a Congressional Research Service Report, Rouhani “is believed amenable 
to a nuclear deal with the international community that would reduce international 
sanctions but not necessarily preclude any options for Iran’s nuclear program over the 
long term.”  Additionally, U.S. policymakers should realize that Rouhani is a political 
insider who has held various positions within Iran’s government.147  Thus, the United 
States should exercise diplomacy toward the Rouhani administration, but with caution. 
As the United States engages in negotiations with Iran, it should consider the 
drivers behind Iran’s nuclear program – namely, security and prestige – and determine 
how the United States could help Iran obtain these objectives through alternate means.  
G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter recommend:  “To the extent that Iranian 
behavior is driven or shaped by a sense of insecurity, the United States should be willing 
to offer Iran assurances that assuage its legitimate fears.”148  For instance, if Iran pledges 
not to develop nuclear weapons and allows the IAEA to verify such a promise, the United 
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States could promise not to attack Iran unless it was countering Iranian military 
aggression.149 
 Some scholars disagree with the traditional diplomacy option, arguing it could 
hurt democracy efforts in Iran.  Shahram Akbarzadeh argues that a policy of engagement 
with Iran risks undermining U.S. support of human rights and democracy.  According to 
Akbarzadeh, Obama's efforts to engage Iran undercut democracy, the United States' long-
term goal for the Middle East region.150  Akbarzadeh explains that engagement attempts 
by Obama's administration “appeared to be sanctioning the incumbent regime in Iran and 
turning its back on the democratic aspirations of Iranian reformers and demonstrators.”151  
Although engagement may make pro-democracy efforts in Iran more difficult, the United 
States could adopt a policy of engagement that objects to hardline Iranian politics and 
encourages moderation within the context of the current regime.   
Furthermore, Akbarzadeh's analysis, which appears to be informed by liberalism, 
may exaggerate the United States' emphasis on democracy in foreign policy.  Even 
though the United States may claim to want democracy for the Middle East, in practice, it 
has supported undemocratic governments, including Saudi Arabia and Mubarak's Egypt.  
This indicates that the United States is interested in democracy for countries that are 
unfriendly, but in maintaining the status quo with friendly, non-democratic Middle 
Eastern nations.  Thus, it seems that an Iran governed by friendlier, less belligerent 
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leadership could be acceptable to the United States, even if it maintains its current 
structure.   
Soft Power and Public Diplomacy 
 
The United States could also use public diplomacy to influence the nature of the 
current Iranian regime.  Roberts defines public diplomacy as “governmental or 
governmentally funded foreign policy activity.  Its objective is to create, for a given 
country, as positive a climate as possible among foreign publics in order to facilitate the 
explanation and hopefully acceptance of its foreign policy.”152  U.S. interest in promoting 
democracy, as well as the use of public diplomacy, could be seen as having roots in 
liberal thought.  For example, Snyder sees liberalism as influencing George W. Bush’s 
policies aimed at establishing Middle Eastern liberal democracies.153  Ikenberry and 
Kupchan, who describe their theoretical beliefs as “liberal realism,” advocate for a 
measured use of public diplomacy by arguing that “in general, the United States should 
continue to encourage and facilitate the promotion of democracy abroad, but it must 
realize that durable liberalization must come from within and not be imposed from the 
outside.”154 
Joseph Nye identifies three elements of public diplomacy.  First, daily 
communication aimed at foreign media outlets should seek to provide a framework for 
policies, so harmful policy misinterpretations can be avoided.155  Second, countries 
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should employ strategic communication to further policies or ideas.  Third, countries 
should use programs such as seminars, scholarships, and exchanges to foster relationships 
with foreign publics.156  Public diplomacy can be considered a form of soft power.157  
According to Nye, soft power “co-ops people rather than coerces them.  Soft power rests 
on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”158  In contrast, “hard power can rest on 
inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’).”159  
Detailed information about U.S. public diplomacy initiatives in Iran is difficult to 
obtain.  The State Department has supported programs that advance democracy, but it 
does not identify recipients of these funds.  A portion of this money has been devoted to 
Iran via public diplomacy, broadcasts, and exchange efforts.  Under George W. Bush, the 
United States worked to alter the nature of the Iranian regime by supporting pro-
democracy activists in Iran.  The 2006 Iran Freedom Support Act allocated an 
unspecified amount of money for pro-democracy efforts in Iran.  Under President Obama, 
funding has been requested for Near East regional democracy programs, but Iran was not 
specified.  According to the Congressional Research Service, specific information 
regarding fund use is sensitive.  The Obama administration has emphasized connecting 
with Iranians via non-controversial issues such as the environment, health care, and 
science.  Nonetheless, funds supporting Iranian human rights activists, journalists, and 
Iranian visits to the United States were given less importance in 2009.  In addition, the 
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Iran Human Rights Documentation Center at Yale University, which recorded Iranian 
human rights violations, was defunded by the State Department in 2009.  Some experts 
criticized this move.  Furthermore, experts have argued for the expansion of pro-
democracy programs in Iran, contending that the Green Movement proved their 
efficacy.160  
The Green Movement, a term used to describe the protests associated with to the 
2009 Iranian presidential election, was possibly a missed opportunity for the United 
States to exercise soft power and public diplomacy.  Although Ahmadinejad asserted that 
the election results favored him over his opponent, Mir Hussein Mousavi,161 research 
indicates that this election may have been rigged.162  Mark Lagon argues that Obama 
chose to ignore the Green Movement in favor of possibly engaging with Ahmadinejad on 
the nuclear issue.163  According to Lagon, Obama ignored the option to exercise soft 
power, which could have enhanced the Green Movement and furthered U.S. interests.  He 
contends: 
. . . failing to clearly side with Ahmadinejad’s opposition in 2009 represented a 
serious loss of US credibility. . . . By supporting the opposition in Iran through 
soft power, the administration would not only have associated the US with the 
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aspirations of the people in the streets of Tehran but also advanced the objective 
of dislodging a potentially nuclear rogue state.164   
 
However, U.S. support of the opposition could have provided the regime with an 
additional reason to suppress dissidents.  Thus, public diplomacy should be used with 
caution. 
Shahram Chubin also stresses the use of public diplomacy, under which the 
United States would communicate its support of human rights, democracy, and rule of 
law to the Iranian people.165  Although Chubin praises the Obama administration's 
attempt to engage Iran as “courageous,” he argues Iran has not displayed a willingness to 
submit to inspections or significantly suspend its nuclear program.  Chubin also 
maintains, “Disclaimers notwithstanding, the decision to negotiate with Iran today 
inevitably confers a degree of recognition on the regime . . . ”166  In addition, Chubin 
asserts that no consensus exists on the nuclear issue in Iran,167 and he contends that 
moderate Iranians could promote tolerance, plurality, responsibility, and openness in their 
country’s government.168  Chubin’s emphasis on the value of moderate Iranians should be 
integrated into the United States’ public diplomacy strategy toward Iran.  However, his 
analysis may no longer apply to the current regime in Iran.  Furthermore, unlike Chubin 
suggests, the United States need not view engagement and public diplomacy as mutually 
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exclusive.  The United States can negotiate while simultaneously maintaining that a 
nation’s belligerent behavior is unacceptable.  
RAND scholars Keith Crane, Rollie Lal and Jeffrey Martini argue that the United 
States should increase public diplomacy initiatives.169  These scholars, who think 
democracy will probably expand in Iran, argue that the relationship between Iran and the 
United States could improve if Iranians obtained more freedom.  They explain: 
Broadly speaking, the U.S. government has the opportunities to encourage 
Iranians, including members of ethnic groups, to push for expanded civil liberties 
and democratic practices in Iran.  The United States also has the ability to 
encourage policy change in Iran that would liberalize the economy, thereby 
possibly strengthening nongovernmental actors.170   
 
However, Crane, Lal, and Martini caution that short-term gains from this approach will 
likely be small.  Furthermore, given the tensions between the United States and Iran, 
policies toward Iran must be skillfully executed.171  Despite their emphasis on public 
diplomacy, Crane, Lal, and Martini do not advocate for regime change efforts.  They 
caution that “. . . U.S. actions directed toward regime change in Iran are likely to 
backfire.  When facing criticism from the United States, which many Iranians view as 
complicit in the problems of the Iranian political system, Iranian citizens largely rally 
around the regime.”172  
                                                                          
169 Keith Crane, Rollie Lal, Jeffrey Martini, Iran’s Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG693.pdf (accessed December 2, 2012), 113. 
 
170 Ibid., xix.   
 
171 Ibid.  
 
172 Ibid., 33.  
 
 44 
In particular, these scholars argue that the United States should increase public 
diplomacy toward Iran by expanding educational exchanges, increasing local language 
radio broadcasts, and urging individuals such as U.S. officials to interact with Iran’s 
media.173  Crane, Lale, and Martini argue that U.S. public diplomacy should seek to 
influence ethnic minorities in Iran, such as the Turkmen, Kurds, Azeris, Baluch, and 
Arabs.174  Non-Persians make up a sizeable portion of Iran’s demographics, as only half 
of Iran’s population is of Persian ethnicity.  Despite Iran’s emphasis of Shia Islam as a 
common denominator amongst its population, ethnic cleavages still exist regarding 
government job allocation, language usage, and oil revenue sharing.  The RAND 
monograph asserted that non-Persians in Iran, who widely backed prior reformist 
president Mohammad Khatami, “are likely to play a significant role in moving the 
country toward a more-democratic system.”175  Therefore, U.S. public diplomacy efforts 
should support radio broadcasts in languages spoken by ethnic minorities.176  
A RAND report authored by Sara Beth Elson and Alireza Nader suggests that the 
United States should provide broadcasts to Iran, as well as technology that enables 
Iranian Internet users to circumvent filters.177  Elson and Nader argue that the stagnant 
relationship between the United States and Iran has been “partially due to the mutual 
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unawareness caused by the absence of official and cultural ties between the two nations. . 
. . Iranians lack sufficient information to judge the United States and its policies; more 
importantly, they lack a variety of sources for obtaining information.”178  
Currently, public diplomacy toward Iran appears to be a neglected tool in the U.S. 
policy arsenal.  The Green Movement implies the existence of a group of moderate 
Iranians who may be open to U.S. public diplomacy efforts.  Thus, the United States 
should expand public diplomacy efforts toward Iran by informing Iranians about U.S. 
values and policies, and by encouraging moderate Iranians to have a voice and counteract 
hardline politics.  Public diplomacy can empower moderate Iranians to continue seeking 
change for their nation.  Finally, United States should pursue public diplomacy in 
conjunction with traditional diplomacy.  By avoiding a message of regime change, the 
United States can employ both policy options while avoiding a contradictory posture 
toward Iran.   
Public diplomacy without the component of regime change seems counterintuitive 
when considering liberalism’s democratic peace theory, which asserts that democratic 
nations are less likely to attack one another.  Under this concept, the United States would 
seemingly want to install a liberal democracy in Iran, as this type of government would 
no longer pose a threat to the United States or other democratic nations.  However, as 
realism and suggests, the United States’ soft power must be used judiciously to avoid 
provoking other nations to engage in balancing.  As Ikenberry and Slaughter argue, by 
“using our status as the sole superpower . . . to try to unilaterally transform the domestic 
politics of other states, we have triggered a backlash that increases extreme anti-
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Americanism, discourages key actors from fully cooperating with us, and weakens our 
global authority.”179  To ensure that the United States uses its power in a measured 
fashion, U.S. public diplomacy efforts should be conducted prudently and without a 
message of regime change.   
Sanctions 
 
 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott define 
sanctions as “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threats of withdrawal, of 
customary trade or financial relations.”180  The United States' policy toward Iran has 
featured a mixture of sanctions, including some aimed at hampering Iran's nuclear 
program.181  Dana H. Allin and Steven consider sanctions to often be harmful and merely 
symbolic.  Yet, they argue that sanctions may be necessary “to indicate international 
disapproval of Iran's behaviour [sic], and to reassure Israel that the problem is not 
forgotten.”182 Daniel W. Drezner's work, which focuses on the use of carrots or 
incentives in foreign policy, concludes that economic or military coercive measures are 
often preferable to incentives.183  Drezner argues that carrots are costly when successful, 
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but threats of coercion are costly when unsuccessful.  Therefore, he considers sanctions 
to be less costly than incentives.184   
 Although the United States' policy has emphasized sanctions toward Iran, broader 
research regarding sanctions casts doubts on their effectiveness.  For example, Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Elliott's extensive monograph evaluates economic sanctions by looking at 
116 cases via a chart, and 11 cases in more detail.185  The study concludes with the 
following: “Although it is not true that sanctions ‘never work,’ they are of limited utility 
in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the target country to take 
actions it stoutly resists.”186  The authors assess that sanctions have worked in some 
cases, especially when they are aimed toward small countries and involve more limited 
policy objectives.187  However, the authors assert that sanctions intended to affect major 
policy changes or foreign military capacities were usually not effective.188  If this study's 
results hold true, sanctions seem unlikely to impede Iran's nuclear program.   
However, sanctions may have led to Rouhani’s election and incentivized Iran’s 
participation in nuclear negotiations.  For instance, a Congressional Research Study 
report argued that Rouhani’s election was “an indication of the growing public pressure 
on the regime to achieve an easing of sanctions.”189  While nuclear talks with Iran may 
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prove unproductive, any form of engagement could lead to results, and as such, is 
preferable to the former stalemate between the United States and Iran.  Nonetheless, the 
United States should not cease all sanctions unless a favorable, verifiable agreement is 
reached to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.     
Meanwhile, as liberal theory suggests, the United States should continue 
promoting multilateral sanctions by working within the context of international 
institutions, as such behavior will likely buttress U.S. legitimacy and have more success 
than unilateral sanctions.  For example, in June 2010, U.S. efforts helped ensure the 
passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, which levied 
comprehensive sanctions towards Iran.  Additionally, the United States has leveraged its 
alliances with Canada, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the European Union, 
to direct additional pressure towards Iran.190 
Pessimist Approach 
 
 Some scholars assert that no solution exists to Iran's nuclear ambitions.  Donette 
Murray, for instance, offers a pessimistic analysis of past U.S. policies toward Iran.  
Murray discusses the United States' history of using containment toward Iran, which 
occurred during the presidential administrations of Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and 
George W. Bush.  According to Murray, sanctions were unable to keep Iran from 
obtaining items related to its nuclear ambitions.  In addition, she notes the difficulty of 
pursuing engagement with Iran.191  She explains there was “a tension between 
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incremental versus substantive talks and a debilitating anxiety over how to get the 
balance right when attempting to reach out.”192  Comprehensive talks were problematic 
because they involved addressing difficult topics, including zero-sum gain issues such as 
nuclear weapons.193  Finally, Murray questions whether any U.S. action can change 
important aspects of Iran's behavior.194  Similarly, Volker Perthes suggests there is no 
solution for Iran's nuclear pursuits.  He recommends engaging Iran on other issues, such 
as Afghanistan.195  Although these scholars present compelling arguments, given U.S. 
interests in the region, the United States should endeavor to prevent Iran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon, even if the chance of success is low.  Moreover, recent developments 




 James Dobbins, special envoy to Afghanistan under George W. Bush, suggests 
that both sanctions and negotiations can be used toward Iran.  He explains: “Obama has 
said that he is not willing to negotiate indefinitely and that if Iran does not move soon on 
the central issues of its nuclear program, the United States will seek additional sanctions.  
This is a false dichotomy.  Sanctions and negotiations are not alternatives . . .”196  
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According to Dobbins, engagement can be useful even when it fails, as it can increase 
information and lead to improved policy.197  Dobbins’ arguments for a combined 
approach are compelling and should be seriously considered by U.S. policymakers, 
especially since sanctions and engagement appear to be currently working together in an 
effective manner.  
Conclusion 
 
 Iran’s nuclear ambitions have posed a significant challenge for the United States.  
Iran’s past attempts to conceal its nuclear program, combined with its uranium 
enrichment efforts, suggest that Iran could have the capacity to develop a nuclear 
weapon.  Historically, Iran’s nuclear program appears to have been motivated by a sense 
of insecurity, along with the desire to balance against a growing U.S. power in the region.  
Iran’s intentions regarding developing a nuclear weapon are more difficult to assess.  Due 
to the predominantly rational nature of the Iranian regime, if Iran did develop a nuclear 
weapon, it is unlikely to use such a weapon in an offensive capacity.  Nonetheless, realist 
scholars like Waltz seem too optimistic about nuclear weapons proliferation.  Given that 
nuclear weapons equal increased power in the international sphere, the United States has 
an interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear capabilities.   
U.S. interests dictate that the United States should attempt to slow or halt Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions.  Upon examination, all possible policy options come with advantages 
and disadvantages.  Engagement with the current Iranian regime, which may possibly 
provide an opportunity for accommodation, information gathering, and reintegration of 
Iran into a new regional framework, risks harming democracy efforts in Iran.  Diplomatic 
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talks may also be seen as a U.S. endorsement of Iran’s non-liberal regime.  Public 
diplomacy, which may encourage democracy efforts in Iran, may harm U.S. attempts to 
engage the current regime.  Although sanctions are a way to demonstrate U.S. 
disapproval of Iran, they statistically have a low chance of success.  
However, the United States must still attempt to mitigate security risks cause by 
Iran’s nuclear program.  The United States will be best served by adopting a multi-policy 
approach toward Iran.  As demonstrated by a review of literature on this topic, many 
scholars create false dichotomies amongst policy options.  In contrast, a multi-policy 
approach can be consistently implemented if all three policies work toward a common 
goal: moderating Iran’s leadership without seeking regime change.  First, the United 
States should seek to employ traditional diplomacy by continuing to participate in 
multilateral talks regarding Iran’s nuclear program.  While participating in these talks, the 
United States should attempt to address the drivers behind an Iranian nuclear program, 
such as prestige and security.  If the United States is able to address these concerns 
through alternate means, talks with Iran are more likely to succeed.  Additionally, the 
United States should use the carrot of sanctions relief to influence Iran during 
negotiations.   
Second, the United States should expand public diplomacy initiatives toward Iran 
through programs such as educational exchanges, broadcasts, and engagement with the 
Iranian media.  Expanding these efforts would be a change to current U.S. policy.  U.S. 
public diplomacy efforts should seek to inform Iranians about U.S. policy and foster an 
understanding between the two countries’ publics.  Public diplomacy should seek to 
empower dissatisfied Iranians, such as those who participated in the Green Movement, by 
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encouraging them to advocate for a moderate government.  However, public diplomacy 
efforts must be undertaken judiciously and should not aim to induce regime change.  
Finally, the United States should continue using sanctions unless a successful nuclear 
deal is reached.  The United States should continue to leverage alliances and international 
institutions by advocating for multilateral sanctions, which will likely be more successful 
than unilateral sanctions.  These policies provide the best chance of halting or at least 
slowing Iran’s nuclear program.  Simultaneously, these policies help promote the 
responsible use of U.S. power and, as such, help fortify the United States’ role as the 
world’s hegemon.  
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Chapter 2: Iran’s Shia Identity and its Regional Foreign Policy 
 
“Do you know the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite?”  New York Times 
reporter Jeff Stein asked this question to a variety of high-ranking officials, including 
distinguished individuals from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
congressional intelligence committees.  The results were not impressive.  Many officials 
had no concept of the Sunni-Shia split or what countries adhered to which version of 
Islam.  For instance, FBI chief of national security Willie Hulon erroneously stated that 
Iran was Sunni, even though he correctly identified al Qaeda as Sunni.198  These results 
indicate a need for U.S. policymakers to understand the Sunni-Shia split and how it 
influences Middle Eastern politics.  It is especially important for policymakers to 
understand how Shia dynamics impact the behavior of Iran, a country where 90 percent 
of its 70 million people are Shia Muslim.199  The historical challenges associated with 
U.S.-Iran relations only increase this need. 
 This chapter seeks to understand how Iran’s identity as a Shia nation influences 
its behavior as a regional actor in the Middle East.  To accomplish this, the chapter will 
provide a brief background on the Sunni-Shia split.  Next, to better understand Iran’s 
foreign policymaking, the chapter will examine the region through the framework offered 
by the international relations theories of neorealism and constructivism.  This section 
asserts that both neorealism and constructivism can help explain the dynamics present in 
the Middle East.  Neorealism’s emphasis on state behavior, however, fails to account for 
non-state actors and ethnic cleavages, both of which play an important role in the region.  
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Constructivism highlights the important role of identity in the region, but provides less 
guidance on how to understand state intentions.  This section also argues that 
neorealism’s balance of power concept, if modified, could help explain the role of non-
state actors and Sunni/Shia dynamics in the Middle East.   
Subsequently, the chapter examines how Iran’s Shia identity informs major 
aspects of its regional foreign policy posture.  First, this section defines the concept of 
pragmatism and argues that tensions between ideology and pragmatism have existed 
throughout Iranian history.  Second, it analyzes Iran's geopolitical concerns associated 
with the nation’s hegemonic aspirations and relationship with Iraq.  Third, it considers 
Iran's security concerns by examining Iranian nuclear ambitions.  Fourth, it looks at Iran's 
support of non-state actors.  This section argues that although Iran's religious identity is 
Shia, the nation’s regional policy choices seem to be primarily based on pragmatic 
concerns for influence and self-preservation.  Shia beliefs and ideological motivators may 
also play a role in Iranian foreign policy, but their impact remains secondary to 
pragmatism.  Iran's Shia identity does, however, impact the perception other Muslim-
majority nations have of Iran.  While Iran's Shia identity may help Iran build 
relationships with other Shia communities, it may also hinder Iran’s relations with Sunni 
nations.  Thus, Iran appears to either downplay or highlight its Shia identity depending on 
expediency.   
The Sunni-Shia Split 
 
 The Sunni-Shia division was initially caused by a disagreement regarding who 
should succeed the Prophet Muhammad after his death.  The Shia contended that 
Muhammad's family members were the rightful leaders of the Muslims.  In contrast, 
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Sunni Muslims thought that the Prophet's successor only needed to be an able leader and 
commendable Muslim.200  Adherents of Shia Islam believe that spiritual authority is 
vested in the descendents of the Prophet Muhammad through the line of his cousin and 
son-in-law, Ali.  These leaders or descendents are called the imamate.  In “Twelver” Shia 
Islam, which most Shia adhere to, Shias believe there were twelve Imams in history.  The 
last imam is considered the “Hidden Imam,” and at the present, he is spiritually occulted.  
However, this imam will come back as a redeemer-type figure called the Mahdi.201   
Iran’s current system of government is centered on a concept developed by the 
deceased Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini: velayat-e faqih.  Shias historically have 
contended that after the twelfth Imam or Mahdi disappeared, the political authority of the 
Imams was suspended.  However, Khomeini asserted that the clerics have the political 
authority to rule during the Mahdi’s occultation, and if a jurist decides to form a 
government, other jurists are obligated to follow.  This idea goes against Shia tradition, 
since no jurist has traditionally been considered to hold authority over another.  
Furthermore, the leading Shia jurists, called marja’ al-taqlid, especially did not hold 
preeminence over one another.202  
Vali Nasr explains the differences between the two sects as follows: “Shiism and 
Sunnism not only understand Islamic history, theology, and law differently, but each 
breathes a distinct ethos of faith and piety that nurtures a particular temperament and a 
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unique approach to the question of what it means to be Muslim.”203  Approximately 10 to 
15 percent or 130 to 195 million Muslims adhere to Shia Islam.  The Shia communities in 
Iran and Iraq comprise over half of the world's Shia.  Other sizable Shia populations are 
located in Pakistan, Lebanon, India, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.  The Sunni-Shia split has 
important political ramifications for the Muslim world,204 including Iran’s regional policy 
decisions.   
Understanding the Middle Eastern Region: Neorealism and Constructivism  
 
Neorealism or structural realism, a subset of the international relations theory of 
realism, offers insights that can help explain Middle Eastern power dynamics and provide 
a framework for interpreting Iran’s regional posture.  Stephen M. Walt summarizes 
Kenneth N. Waltz’s version of neorealism: 
For Waltz, the international system consisted of a number of great powers, each 
seeking to survive.  Because the system is anarchic (i.e., there is no central 
authority to protect states from one another), each state has to survive on its own.  
Waltz argued that this condition would lead weaker states to balance against, 
rather than bandwagon with, more powerful rivals.205  
 
This theory’s emphasis on anarchy and insecurity seems to align with realities present in 
the region, including rampant conflict and war.206  Additionally, neorealism’s balance of 
power concept could help explain the behavior of states in the region.  Waltz provides the 
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following explanation of the concept: “Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a 
potential danger to others. . . . Some of the weaker states in the system will therefore act 
to restore a balance and thus move the system back to bi- or multipolarity.”207  Although 
the balance of power concept focuses primarily on the international sphere,208 the idea 
could also be applied at a regional level. 
However, neorealism’s sole emphasis on state behavior precludes the possibility 
that other forces could provide balance within an international or regional system.  
Neorealist scholar John J. Mearsheimer admits that because realism focuses on states, 
non-state actors such as al Qaeda do not fit into the theory.  However, he argues that 
realism cannot be adjusted to account for terrorist groups, because this would dilute the 
theory.209  Nonetheless, he asserts that “Al-Qaeda operates within the state system, which 
operates according to realist logic. . . . Still, there are limits to what realism can tell us 
about Al-Qaeda, because it is a non-state actor, and there is no room for non-state actors 
in structural realism.”210   
Moreover, Steve Yetiv writes that the balance of power theory “does not allow for 
balancing behavior that is motivated by factors such as ideological preferences, the 
internal characteristics of states, the type of government, the quality of decision making, 
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or particular features of their leaders.”211  The balance of power theory fails to consider 
these factors because neorealism assumes that state interests are universal and 
unchanging.  Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett argue that “little doubt exists that 
during the last two decades many scholars working in the systemic tradition assumed that 
the homogeneity of state interest was a logical starting point.212   
 In contrast, the international relations theory213 of constructivism contends that 
identity can influence state behavior.214  According to Alexander Wendt, constructivism 
emphasizes: “(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by 
shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of 
purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”215  
Constructivism recognizes that factors such as religion, ethnicity, language, and culture 
form the foundation of group identities.216  Although realism cannot explain supra-state 
ideologies that lead to conflict, such as Zionism, Islamic fundamentalism, and Pan 
Arabism,217 constructivism can help explain the influence of such ideologies.218 
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Additionally, while neorealism claims that conflict in the Middle East is related to the 
anarchic nature of the international system, constructivism can help explain other sources 
of this conflict, including imperialism, the Israel-Palestine issue, oil, and subjective 
borders.219   
 Constructivism can also help explain Sunni and Shia dynamics present in the 
Middle East.  Mari Luomi explains that constructivism considers sectarian tensions in the 
Middle East to originate from the “bottom-up,” meaning that “inter-state relations are 
contingent upon the way identity is constructed: supra-state and –national identities, such 
as the Shia identity, compete with state identity in the Middle East.”220  Conversely, 
neorealism contends that states use sectarian issues instrumentally to advance their own 
interests.  Therefore, Luomi argues that neorealism provides the best understanding of the 
regional landscape, whereas constructivism most adequately explains sectarianism that 
exists inside states.221  However, constructivism’s emphasis on identity need not be 
confined to interpreting Sunni and Shia tensions within states – it could also help explain 
the sectarianism prevalent throughout the region.   
Unlike constructivism, neorealism fails to account for a variety of factors that play 
a role in the Middle East.  If neorealism was expanded, Sunni and Shia actors could be 
viewed as competing forces in the Middle East that seek to balance one another.  
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Certainly, not every conflict in the Middle East is caused by sectarian tensions, and there 
are variances in beliefs within the Sunni and Shia sects.  Nonetheless, history 
demonstrates that balancing between Sunni and Shia actors has occurred in recent years.  
In 2006 and 2007, Nasr argued for the existence of a Shia rise or revival throughout the 
Middle East: “The Shia revival will further bolster the expansion of Iran's regional 
influence and its claim to ‘great power' status.”222  However, subsequent events suggest 
that Sunni Islam has been a balancing force to Shiism.  For instance, Sunni fighters in 
Syria are disrupting the government led by Bashar al-Assad, an Alawite supported by 
Iran.  Moreover, the al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
propelled by the belief that Shias should be killed merely because of religious affiliation, 
is violently targeting Shia civilians in Iraq.223   
All this suggests that the balance of power in the Middle East transcends states – 
it involves sectarian dynamics and includes non-state groups.  As a non-state group, the 
Sunni Muslim Brotherhood managed to, at least temporarily, wrest power from the 
entrenched Egyptian government during the Arab Spring.  Hezbollah and Hamas are two 
other examples of non-state groups that succeeded in obtaining key positions of power in 
the region.  Neorealism should, therefore, be modified to include non-state groups as 
aspects of the balance of power.  As Douglas Lemke argues, “existing power politics 
theories are not logically restricted to analysis of only official states.  Statements by 
Waltz and others that official states are the primary actors in world politics are not proof 
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that their theories do not apply to nonstate actors.”224  Scholars like Mearsheimer will 
likely argue such a revision would be impossible, as it would weaken realism and perhaps 
invalidate other portions of the theory.  If the theory was modified to include non-state 
actors, it should only include groups that could practically engage in balancing behaviors.  
Non-state actors that possess significant caches of weapons, such as Hezbollah, could 
potentially engage in balancing.  Smaller groups that lack such capabilities would 
probably be unable to impact the regional balance of power.   
Alternately, another theory could be developed that better aligns with the current 
realities in the Middle East.  One potential candidate is the modified liberal theory 
articulated by Andrew Moravcsik.  The first assumption in his theory states: “The 
fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on 
the average rational and risk-averse and who organize and exchange collective action to 
promote differentiated interests . . .”225  While a complete analysis of Moravscik’s theory 
would exceed the scope of this thesis, the theory’s focus on individuals and groups 
should be considered when analyzing the Middle East.   
Both neorealism and constructivism can help scholars and policymakers 
understand the Middle Eastern region.  Neorealism highlights the importance of survival 
as a driver of state behavior and provide insight into the anarchic nature of the 
international system.  However, it ignores questions of identity and assumes that state 
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interests are static and unchanging.  Constructivism emphasizes the role of identity, 
including supra-state identities, in the region.  However, even though constructivism 
purportedly seeks to improve states’ understanding of each other, it does not provide a 
mechanism for accomplishing this.  Neorealism, in contrast, provides a framework that 
helps states interpret each other’s intentions.226  Thus, scholars and policymakers could 
benefit from understanding both theories.  Moreover, regardless of which theory is used 
to interpret Middle Eastern dynamics, the Sunni-Shia split will continue to impact the 
region and influence Iran’s foreign policy choices.    




 The following sections consider how Iran’s Shia identity influences the nation’s 
foreign policy.  As demonstrated below, Iran’s foreign policy behavior tends to be 
primarily motivated by pragmatism, rather than ideology.  In this context, the term 
pragmatism is used to refer to the concept known as Realpolitik or realistic policy, “a 
foreign policy that recognizes self-interest and power as the driving forces of 
international reality.”227  R. K Ramazani asserts that “the balance of ideology and 
pragmatism in the making of Iranian foreign policy decisions has been one of the most 
persistent, intricate, and difficult issues in all Iranian history, from the sixth century B.C., 
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when the Iranian state was born, to the present time.”228  He argues that Iranian 
policymakers have historically attempted to combine pragmatism with spirituality, and 
cites Cyrus (558-530 B.C.) and Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) as examples of Iranian leaders 
who employed pragmatic statesmanship.  In addition, he explains that since the Iranian 
revolution, the blend of pragmatism and spirituality “has often been expressed in terms of 
the Quranic-based norm of hikmah (wisdom) and hekmat in Persian.  Hekmat has two 
dimensions, pragmatic . . . as well as spiritual.”229  Thus, it seems warranted to consider 
Iran’s behavior through this lens.  
Geopolitical Concerns: Regional Hegemony  
 
Iran's aspiration toward regional dominance has historically been part of Iran's 
foreign policy orientation.  This drive has been influenced by Iranian geography, history, 
and status as a long-standing civilization.230  A multitude of scholars concur that Iran is 
currently aspiring toward regional hegemony.  For example, Ze'ev Maghen claims that 
Iran has sought to lead the Muslim world since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  Iran's desire 
for regional hegemony is one of its fundamental goals, the other goal being self-
preservation.231  According to Shahram Chubin, Iran sees itself as resisting the United 
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States, a country seeking supremacy in the Middle East.232  As Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
stated, Iran resists U.S. hegemony by “presenting a blueprint for an Islamic republic . . . 
and defending the deprived masses in the world of Islam and the wronged people who 
have been trampled upon by tyranny.”233  Thus, Chubin explains that Iran “is a revisionist 
state in terms of status, not territory.”234  
 A report by several RAND analysts provides a similar, but more nuanced view 
regarding Iran's regional ambitions, arguing that “many within [Iran’s] current regime 
appear to view Iran as indispensable regional power, but not necessarily a revolutionary 
hegemon.”235  Iranian perception towards regional hegemony is reflected in an article in 
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) weekly magazine, which states, “The 
U.S. considers Iran as a challenge to its hegemony in the region.  At the same time, the 
U.S. has realized that its victory in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine is dependent on its 
relations with Iran.”236  With the fall of Afghanistan and Iraq's Sunni regimes, Iran's 
ability to further enhance its regional standing increased.  Because the hostile Taliban and 
Ba'athist regimes no longer surround Iran, the country can pursue greater regional 
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 Iran's Shia identity plays a role in its goals of regional supremacy.  As the largest 
Shia nation, Iran has been closely linked to Persian Gulf Shia communities and to 
countries where Shias are influential, including Lebanon and Iraq.238  Iran's leaders have 
a history of using Shia identity to further their internal and external goals.  According to 
some analysts, Shia ideology was used to enhance Iran's regional standing even prior to 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when the Shah was in power in Iran.239  Shia identity has 
also been used to garner internal support for the regime.  For instance, Ayatollah 
Khomeini used the message of Shia messianism to further his leadership of the 
revolution.240   
 Vali Nasr sees the rise of leaders like former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as 
indication that Sunni opposition and Shia resurgence will become increasingly important 
in Iran's regional and political goals.241  This claim seems likely considering the 
background of Ahmadinejad, who comes from a particularly anti-Sunni and anti-
Wahhabi element of the Islamic Revolution that strongly adhered to core Shia values.  
After Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, Iranian propaganda against resident Sunnis 
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became increasingly harsh.242   
  Nonetheless, Iran's Shia identity poses a challenge to the nation’s regional desires.  
Although the majority of Iran's population is Shia,243 most Muslims worldwide are 
Sunni.244  Iran's rise to power can be interpreted by Sunni nations as a Shia rise, and as 
such, Sunni countries may feel threatened by Iran's advancement toward regional 
hegemony.  Jordan's King Abdullah II voiced concerns of a “Shiite crescent” of political 
influence stretching from the Persian Gulf to Lebanon and Syria, a crescent Abdullah saw 
as originating from Iran and Iraq.245  Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt spokesman Essam el-
Erian echoed these fears, stating, “If Iran developed a nuclear power, then it is a big 
disaster because it already supports Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, Syria and 
Iraq, then what is left? . . . We would have the Shiite crescent that the Jordanian king 
warned against.”246   
Sheik Adel al-Mawada, deputy speaker in Bahrain's parliament and member of 
the Sunni fundamentalist Salafi bloc, stated similar concerns:  “If Iran acted like an 
Islamic power, just Islam without Shiism, then Arabs would accept it as a regional 
Islamic power. . . . But if it came to us with the Shia agenda as a Shiite power, then it will 
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not succeed and it will be powerful, but despised and hated.”247  Although Arab concerns 
over Iran could stem from resistance to a changing power dynamic in the Middle East, 
Mawada’s quote suggests that at least some Arab politicians foster suspicion toward 
Iran’s rise simply because of its Shia identity.  Moreover, Iran’s Persian identity could 
also cause Arab nations to view the country as an outsider.  
 As Mawada suggested, Iran’s regional interests are likely furthered when the 
nation embraces its Islamic identity and downplays its Shia roots to Sunni nations.  Iran 
appears to be trying to mitigate international Sunni concerns by influencing Arab public 
opinion in its favor.  Through the ensejam-e-Eslami or “Islamic harmony” campaign, Iran 
has attempted to spread the message that Sunni Islam and Shiism are essentially the 
same, with differences between the two being small and inconsequential.  This message 
was spread through the press, music, billboards, websites, international conferences, 
advertisements, prayer services, speaking tours, articles in a variety of languages, and 
religious scholars' books.248  Iran has used both local and transnational media to 
disseminate messages that it supports the Palestinians and Hezbollah and challenges the 
status quo.249  
 Iran's anti-Israel and anti-Western rhetoric may have been employed strategically 
in order to distract from Sunni-Shia sectarian concerns and further Iran's regional goals.  
Arab publics supported former president Ahmadinejad's hostility toward Israel, as well as 
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his resistance to U.S. demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program.250  Perhaps as an 
attempt to increase its regional popularity, Iran blamed the Jews and Western powers for 
creating sectarian strife between the Shia and Sunni communities.251  Ahmadinejad stated 
that “the main goal of the leaders of the U.S. in Bahrain and Libya is saving the Zionist 
regime, even if thousands of people are killed . . . They are trying to incite Iran-Arab 
conflict and Shia-Sunni war in the region only to save the Zionist regime.”252  Similarly, 
Supreme Leader Khamenei said, “In the modern era, colonialism made the maximum use 
of the (Muslims') ignorance, prejudices, and unsound understanding to create division, 
and after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, this process was intensified . . .”253  
Ahmadinejad's foreign policy toward Israel was a shift from prior Iranian leaders who 
supported the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.  Ahmadinejad advocated for 
Israel's removal from the map and challenged the validity of the Holocaust.  According to 
Said Amir Arjomand, “The hardening of Iran's opposition to Israel was fully in line with 
the Leader's continued championship of the Palestinians to bolster his own bid to be the 
Leader of the world's Muslims.”254   
This tenor, however, seems to have changed at least somewhat with the election 
of Iran’s new president, Rouhani.  Rouhani, for instance, dodged a question from a 
reporter regarding whether the Holocaust was “a myth.”  Rouhani did describe Israel’s 
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government as “an occupier and usurper” that “does injustice to the people of the region, 
and has brought instability to the region, with its warmongering politics.”  Nonetheless, 
Rouhani’s rhetoric still seems to lack the vitriol of Ahmadinejad’s – he clarified that Iran 
was “seeking peace and stability among all nations in the region . . .”255   By softening its 
rhetoric on Israel, Iran could be attempting to change its reputation as a “rogue nation” 
and reintegrate itself into the international system.  However, by remaining opposed to 
Israel, Iran could be indicating a desire to unite with Arab nations around a common 
cause. 
 In summary, while Iran's Shia identity is important, Iran appears to be minimizing 
this characteristic when dealing with Sunni nations.  By emphasizing commonalities Iran 
shares with Sunni Muslims, Iran is likely trying to lessen concerns of Shia dominance or 
a Shia crescent.  Former president Ahmadinejad's hostile language toward the West and 
Israel could be interpreted an attempt to gain stature in the Muslim world and distract 
from sectarian divides.  These actions could be seen as motivated by practical, rather than 
ideological or religious, concerns.   
Geopolitical Concerns: Iran's Relationship with Iraq   
 
 Another major element of Iran's current regional policy orientation is its 
relationship with post-war Iraq.256  A statement from Ayatollah Khamenei illustrates the 
importance of Iraq to Iran: “Although certain people are worried about the expansion of 
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ties between Tehran and Baghdad, we think that strengthening of ties is in favor of us and 
the region.”257  Iran is interested in a Shia-led Iraqi government, as this would enhance 
Iran's ability to establish religious-based ties with Iraq.258  Iran does not think Iraqi Shias 
will support Iranian goals over their own interests, although it does hope a Shia-led Iraq 
will be a friendly neighbor.  Furthermore, Iran is interested in preventing Iraq from being 
led by Sunnis, who have previously engaged in war with Iran.259  Iran's current policy is 
significantly affected by memories of the Iran-Iraq war.  According to majority opinion in 
Iran, Sunni dominance in Iraq was the source of Iraqi hostility.260  Thus, Iran's desire to 
strengthen relationships with Iraqi Shias may stem from practical, as opposed to 
religious, considerations.  It seems logical for Iran to use its religious commonality as a 
way to exert soft power in Iraq.261     
 Iran's foreign policy in Iraq reflects several key interests.  First, Iran realized its 
goals in Iraq would be best furthered through democracy, which would inevitably 
strengthen Iraq's Shias.262  Thus, Iran has supported elections in Iraq.  Iran also wants to 
maintain a unified Iraq, as an Iraq divided into multiple nations would lead to 
instability.263  A fractured Iraq would lead to refugee challenges and possibly encourage 
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secession amongst Iran’s minorities, including the Kurds.264  The concern of a divided 
Iraq was voiced in February 1980 by Saddam Hussein,265 who stated, “[U]nless the 
inhabitants of Iraq demonstrated their loyalty to a specifically Iraqi state, the country 
would be divided into three 'mini-states': one Arab Sunni, one Arab Shi'i and one 
Kurdish.”266  Furthermore, because Iran's regional goals were threatened by the presence 
of U.S. forces in the area,267 Iran advocated for the removal of these forces.  Ayatollah 
Khamenei stated, “The presence of American and British military men and their experts 
and security forces in Iraq is harmful to that country and the occupying armies should go 
out of Iraq as soon as possible, since any delay in this matter, even for one day, would do 
more harm to the Iraqi nation.”268  In light of these varied goals, Iran has pursued several 
seemingly conflicting policies: it has supported elections, tolerated certain Sunni 
elements, and funded Shia militias.269   
 Iran also pursues its objectives in the region by funding Shia political parties, 
including the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Dawa.270  Although these 
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parties state they operate independently from Tehran, Iran can substantially influence 
Iraqi politics through their infrastructure.271  Iran's longstanding relationship with ISCI 
demonstrates Iran's commitment to exerting influence in Iraq through the party.  ISCI 
was established on November 17, 1982 by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim.272  Al-Hakim 
enjoyed the support of Khamenei, who was not yet Iran's ayatollah, but served as leader 
of Friday prayers in Tehran and as Khomeini's Higher Defense Council representative.273  
ISCI was formed in and funded by Iran.  The Badr Brigade, ISCI’s armed force, received 
the assistance of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.274  Iran has also been tied to ISCI’s 
intelligence unit, which has been managed by Iran.275  Dai Yamao explains that “under 
the auspices of the SCIRI's [ISCI’s] umbrella, the Iranian regime's impact on the Iraqi 
Islamists increased in terms of both direct control and ideological influence.”276  Thus, 
Iranian support of Iraqi Shia political parties can be seen as a consistent element of Iran’s 
foreign policy and a way to exert influence over its neighbor. 
 Iran's goals in Iraq are also impacted by religious considerations regarding Shia 
influence.  The Iraqi city of Najaf and the Iranian city of Qom have both been locations 
of Shia scholarship.  However, Najaf held greater importance than Qom before being 
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suppressed by Iraq's Ba'athist governments.  Consequently, Iran is concerned about Najaf 
increasing in stature.  It is also apprehensive about Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani, a Shia 
leader who enjoys a large following in Najaf schools.277  According to RAND analysts, 
al-Sistani “has long been seen as the most serious challenger to the Supreme Leader's 
claim of more leadership in the Shi'ite world.  It was only the stifling restrictions placed 
on Najaf by Saddam Hussein that prevented al-Sistani from exercising the spiritual, and 
possibly political, influence commensurate with his stature.”278  Al-Sistani also functions 
as a “source of emulation” or marja' al-taqlid – a guide for Shias.  Shias who adhere to 
his guidance include Iranians who are unhappy with Iran's political situation.279  
Furthermore, Ayatollah Khomeini's idea of velayat-e faqih, or “mandate of the jurist to 
rule,”280 is not championed by al-Sistani.281  As mentioned earlier, Khomeini's political 
philosophy subverts the traditional independence of Shia jurists, given that it requires 
jurists to follow another jurist who forms a government.  This position especially 
contradicts the independence of the marja' al-taqlid.282  Although al-Sistani has not 
written about velayat-e faqih, he essentially holds the viewpoint that the concept has a 
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limited scope.283   
 Najaf and al-Sistani thus pose a potential challenge to Iran's theory of government 
and location as an important Shia center of learning.  Iran seems be addressing these 
concerns through the use of economic soft power.  In hopes of improving its Islamic 
reputation, Iran has given cash to Shia school instructors and students.  It has also 
dispatched over 2,000 scholars and students to Karbala and Najaf, Shia cities of 
importance.284  In particular, 'Ali la-Tashkiri, Khamenei's representative, has made trips 
to Iraq to distribute gifts to institutions in the Najaf Learning Center, “thus bringing them 
under Ayatollah Khamenei's influence, making credible his claim to be the spiritual 
leader of all the Muslims of the world.”285  These examples demonstrate Iran's use of soft 
power to improve its standing in the Iraqi Shia religious community.   
 Iran's strategy toward Iraq appears to be primarily driven by pragmatic concerns 
of security and influence.  Iran supports a Shia-dominated Iraq because it furthers Iran's 
security in the region and makes relationships with its neighbor easier to maintain.  Iran 
has also historically sought to influence Iraqi politics, specifically focusing on Shia 
factions in the country.  However, the possible rise of Najaf threatens Iran's standing as a 
center for Shia scholarship.  As such, Iran has attempted to mitigate Iraq’s Shia influence 
through the use of economic soft power. 
Security Concerns: Iran's Nuclear Ambitions 
 
 Iran’s nuclear program has historically been a source of contention between the 
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nation and Western powers, including the United States.  While Iran is currently 
participating in talks regarding its nuclear program, the outcome of such talks is yet to be 
seen.  Analysts disagree on the motives of Iran's nuclear program, some asserting it is 
based on ideological considerations, and others arguing it is pragmatically driven.286  The 
role of Shiism in Iran's nuclear goals also varies.  Some scholars do not discuss Iran's 
Shia identity in relation to its nuclear program, instead focusing on issues such as 
deterrence, regional ambitions, and internal support for the regime.  Others emphasize the 
role of Shia messianism in shaping Iran's nuclear quest.  A third viewpoint focuses on 
how Iran's nuclear goals are interpreted by other countries in the context of the Sunni-
Shia balance of power.  It appears that Iran's nuclear program has been primarily driven 
by pragmatic considerations, and as such remains consistent with other aspects of Iranian 
foreign policy.  Religious considerations may also play a role, albeit a lesser one.  
Finally, Iran's Shia identity seems to influence the way Sunni nations perceive its nuclear 
program. 
 Some scholars identify deterrence, regional ambitions, and increased internal 
patriotism as drivers behind Iran's nuclear policy.  Shahram Chubin asserts that Iran's 
nuclear program was originally motivated by security concerns, but was subsequently 
furthered by a desire for respect and an increased international role.287  Gawdat Bahgat 
highlights Iran's regional ambitions as motivators for its nuclear program, stating that “an 
Iran with nuclear weapons would have increased leverage to influence regional policy, a 
greater ability to intimidate its neighbors, and an enhanced position from which to 
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challenge US involvement in the region.”288  RAND analysts identify deterrence as a key 
driver of Iran's military and political designs, including its ambition for enrichment and a 
possible nuclear weapon.289  Ray Takeyh explains that the nuclear program inspires 
patriotism and increases internal support of the Iranian regime.290  Similarly, Said Amir 
Arjomand says, “. . . Ahmadinejad's insistence on Iran's nuclear 'rights' is popular with 
the Iranian masses and the middle class alike.”291  Explanations of deterrence, regional 
ambitions, and legitimacy as motivators for Iran's nuclear ambitions are consistent with a 
pragmatic view of Iranian foreign policy.   
 In contrast, other scholars highlight religion as a driver behind Iran's nuclear 
program.  Analysts emphasizing the role of Shiism in Iran's nuclear program point to the 
role of the Hidden Imam or Mahdi.292  Considered a messiah-type figure, the occulted 
Mahdi will return prior to the world's end and form a new international government.293  A 
small segment of people take a “violent apocalyptic approach” to the Mahdi, using 
violence as a way to speed his return.294  According to Mehdi Khalaji, former president 
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Ahmadinejad is a part of a secret society that thinks the Mahdi's return is impending.  
This society's beliefs are difficult to discern.  However, Khalaji explains the group 
believes it is possible to speed the Mahdi's return through advanced technology.  In 
addition, some rumors indicate the society would like control over the Iranian nuclear 
program.295  Similarly, Jeffrey Haynes explains, “Many argue that a religious component 
underpins Iran's nuclear programme [sic], which allegedly grows out of an apocalyptic 
vision envisaging widespread devastation or ultimate doom.”296   
 Michael Eisenstadt offers a nuanced interpretation of Iranian policy, arguing that 
tension exists between the practical needs of government and religious commands.  He 
asserts that Iran has been inclined towards pragmatism since the late 1980s.  However, he 
argues that “. . . the operational imperatives that flow from the doctrine of resistance . . . 
and the ideology of political Mahdism (to stand fast and fight the enemies of the Islamic 
Republic in anticipation of the messianic era) coexist uneasily with the pragmatism and 
flexibility in the regime's doctrine of expediency.”297  These types of tensions could be 
partially caused by the divergent views of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei.  Ahmadinejad, 
whose views were apocalyptic, emphasized the Mahdi in his speeches.298  In contrast, 
Khamenei's speeches are not dominated by the Mahdi, and he does not think the Mahdi 
has an impact on a believer's daily life.  Khalaji explains that “. . . Khamenei does not 
hold a political messianic set of ideas, but his religious mentality, mixed with his five 
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decades of political experience, makes him an ambiguous and ambivalent character 
whose ideas can stem from political calculations as well as esoteric consultations.”299 
 Eisenstadt interprets Ahmadinejad's politicization of the Mahdi as a strategic way 
that the former Iranian president furthered his objectives.300  This viewpoint is echoed by 
Iranian clerics.  Mohsen Kadivar, a Tehran-located philosophy professor and reformist 
cleric, was quoted as saying: “. . . The legitimacy of Ahmadinejad comes from traditional 
religious thought [over half a century ago] . . . Ahmadinejad and his men believe it is 
popular, [but] it's a very simple interpretation.  We don't believe in it; the majority of 
academics don't believe in it.”301 According to Qom seminary professor Mohammad Ali 
Ayazi, Ahmadinejad did not possess legitimacy, so he resorted to influencing Iranians 
through religion.  Ayazi was quoted as saying, “It's very dangerous, a person exploiting 
religion for political achievement, because everyone has their own relationship with 
God.”302   
 Thus, Ahmadinejad's use of the Mahdi to possibly legitimize Iran's nuclear 
program may have been a method of increasing his popularity and furthering his 
objectives amongst a certain segment of Iranian society.  However, even if Ahmadinejad 
used the Mahdi as a political motivator, his belief in the Mahdi and in nuclear progress 
for the Mahdi's sake may still be sincere.  Ahmadinejad’s political messianism indicates 
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that Shiism has played a role in Iranian policy, or at least in policy relating to nuclear 
weapons.  However, Ahmadinejad has since been replaced by Rouhani, who seems to be 
more pragmatic and less extreme.  In addition, Khamenei does not appear to be motivated 
by the Mahdi as Ahmadinejad.303  Furthermore, even if religion has influenced Iran’s 
nuclear policies, the nation can still possess an overall foreign policy bent toward 
pragmatism.   
 Iran's Shia identity seems to impact how other countries in the region view Iran's 
nuclear goals.304  Vali Nasr explains that Pakistan's nuclear abilities can be seen as a 
“Sunni Bomb,” and noted that Saudi Arabia funded Pakistan’s nuclear program in pursuit 
of its own regional objectives.305  Iran's initial interest in acquiring nuclear weapons 
stemmed from concerns about the Pakistan-Saudi relationship and Iraq.  Nasr explains, 
“An Iranian nuclear capacity would have helped Iran to contain the Sunni pressure and 
even reverse the balance of power to its own advantage. . . . An Iranian bomb would also 
be a Shia bomb, confirming Shia power in the region and protecting Iran's larger 
footprint.”306  RAND analysts explain that Arab leadership must balance concern towards 
Iran's nuclear program with the understanding that their people are mostly supportive of 
Iran's nuclear goals.  The RAND report states, “. . . some Arab officials are exploiting 
Sunni Arab fears of a Shi'ite ascendancy and sectarian strife in their media outlets to 
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curry favor for what is essentially a classic balance-of-power strategy against Iran.”307   
 However, a Pew Research study demonstrates that Arab publics may not favor 
Iran's nuclear program to the extent that RAND analysts claim.  According to this study, 
76 percent of Jordanians, 66 percent of Egyptians, 54 percent of Turks, and 62 percent of 
Lebanese are actually opposed to Iran obtaining nuclear weapons.  Opposition has grown 
in Jordan and Egypt since 2006.  The results from Tunisians are mixed – 43 percent are 
against it, but 42 percent support it.  These study results suggest that Arab support for 
Iranian nuclear weapons may be largely determined by religious affiliation.  In Lebanon, 
73 percent of Shias are supportive, whereas 94 percent of Sunnis are opposed.308  Further 
research is needed to determine if Arab publics' support of Iranian nuclear weapons is 
based on religious identity.  However, the limited data from the Pew Research Center 
suggests that the Sunni-Shia split plays a role in Arabs’ perception of Iranian nuclear 
ambitions.     
 Iran's nuclear program appears to be primarily motivated by pragmatic concerns, 
such as deterrence, regional goals, and bolstering popular support for the regime.  Shia 
apocalyptic beliefs may have played a lesser role in Iranian nuclear objectives, but these 
factors have likely diminished or disappeared altogether under Rouhani’s new 
presidential leadership.  Finally, Iran's Shia identity appears to impact the way Arab 
nations and their populaces perceive Iran's nuclear program, especially regarding whether 
they view an Iranian bomb as a threat. 
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Iran's Support of Non-State Actors 
 
 Iran's support of militant, non-state actors is one of its main regional foreign 
policy elements.309  This section will explore Iran's support of non-state actors by 
comparing its support of Hamas, a Sunni Palestinian organization, with Hezbollah, a Shia 
Lebanese group.310  Iran's Shia identity seems to affect Iran's policy of supporting 
organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas.  As seen in other aspects of its foreign policy, 
Iran appears mindful of Sunni-Shia tensions present in the Middle East.  It uses support 
of non-state actors as a way to eclipse sectarian concerns and increase its regional 
standing amongst Arabs.  However, these objectives may be harmed by the recent Syrian 
conflict and Iran's decision to support an unpopular dictator.  Iran also supports non-state 
actors for other reasons, such as deterrence.   
 Hamas, which was formed in the late 1960s, is a Palestinian militant organization 
that aims to destroy Israel and form a West Bank and Gaza Islamist state.311  The group is 
a militant offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization conceived in Egypt that is 
both Sunni and Islamist.  To further its political objectives, Hamas targets Israel through 
attacks such as suicide bombings and rocket launches.312  The organization also spends a 
large amount of money in support of social services, including orphanages, health clinics, 
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schools, soup kitchens, sports leagues, and mosques.  Its social service efforts contribute 
to its popularity amongst Palestinians.  Hamas' popularity was seen in the 2006 
Palestinian Authority legislative elections,313 when it won 76 out of 132 seats in the 
Palestinian parliament.314   
 According to the State Department, Iran has provided support to Hamas in the 
form of funds, training, and weapons.315  Some diplomats assert that Iran may provide 
$20 to $30 million in funding to Hamas per annum.316  However, the Syrian conflict 
impacted the relationship between Hamas and Iran.  Hamas' leadership backs the Syrian 
rebels and has departed from Damascus, actions that indicate a possible rupture in the 
Hamas-Iran relationship.317  The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Iranian funds to 
Hamas have been lessened or eliminated after Hamas did not publicly affirm Syrian 
President Bashar Assad.318  Moussa Abu Marzouk, Hamas's deputy political leader, was 
quoted as saying, “Our position on Syria is that we are not with the regime in its security 
solution, and we respect the will of the people . . . The Iranians are not happy with our 
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position on Syria, and when they are not happy, they don't deal with you in the same old 
way.”319 
 Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shia organization that functions as a political party and a 
Shia militia.  The group is designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State 
Department320 and has targeted Israel and U.S. interests.  Hezbollah is estimated to have 
anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and anti-ship weapons, in addition to 40,000 to 80,000 long and 
short-range rockets.  Like Hamas, the organization provides social welfare services such 
as schools and hospitals.321  Iran is closely tied to Hezbollah in a relationship the 
Congressional Research Services describes “as patron-client, or mentor and protege.”322  
Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, subscribes to Ayatollah Khamenei's 
theological direction.  In addition, Hezbollah has received training from the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has given Hezbollah much of the group’s 
weapons.  The U.S. government estimates that Iran provides tens of millions of dollars in 
funds to Hezbollah per year.323  However, Iran's support of Hezbollah does not translate 
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into complete control over the group.324  RAND analysts explain, “Just because the 
ongoing relationship furthers Iran's interests, however, does not necessarily mean that 
Hezbollah will always act in Iran's strategic interests.”325 
 Some scholars argue that Iran supports non-state actors with the goal of increased 
deterrence.  RAND analysts explain that Iranian support of Islamists strengthens Iran's 
deterrent and retaliatory capabilities.326  According to some U.S. government officials, 
Iran may want to use Hezbollah to carry out attacks, thus enabling Iran to increase its 
military power while maintaining “a certain degree of plausible deniability.”327  In 
addition, by supporting Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran aids groups linked to Israel and 
Palestine.  Iran's support of these popular issues could be seen as a way to increase 
regime legitimacy amongst Arabs and bolster Iranian regional goals.  Ray Takeyh asserts, 
“. . . Iran's inflammatory denunciations (even of Israel) can be partly attributed to its 
attempt to mobilize the region behind its leadership.  A defiant Iran flanked by Hezbollah 
and Hamas is standing firm against the Zionist encroachment and has captured the 
imagination of the Arab masses.”328  RAND analysts identify Iran's support of Hezbollah 
and Palestinian groups as buying “Iran enormous symbolic currency among Arab publics 
who are frustrated with the seemingly status quo approach of their authoritarian 
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regimes.”329    
 Similarly, Karim Sadjadpour explains that Iran's support of Hamas has been 
influenced by its regional ambitions and desire to overcome sectarian divisions.  He 
asserts, “Iran's goal is to be the vanguard of the Islamic world and to be the regional 
power.  The last thing they want to do is project Shiite power.  They want to be a pan-
Islamic power, so supporting groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad and supporting the 
Palestinian cause in general is Iran's best way to transcend this Sunni-Shiite divide.”330  
Iran's desire to minimize Sunni-Shia sectarian concerns is also illustrated by Majlis 
speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, who states, “Iran supports the . . . resistance 
movements Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.  Islam is important to us.  We 
will not let enemies cause divisions among us in the name of Shias and Sunni.”331  
Graham Fuller also explains that Iran usually chooses not to highlight its Shia identity, 
but instead focuses on pan-Muslim, popular issues.  Even though Iran supports 
revolutionary issues, Fuller argues that it pursues a pragmatically driven foreign 
policy.332    
 Like other scholars and analysts, RAND analysts downplay the role of religion 
and highlight Iran's realist objectives in supporting non-state actors.  They argue that 
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while religion may play a role, it is secondary to pragmatic considerations.333  Despite 
having interpreted Iran's support of Hamas through the lens of Iran's regional ambitions, 
Sadjadpour argues that Iran's anti-Israel stance is ideologically motivated.334  Iran’s 
support of non-state actors could also be driven by ideological concerns.  Although Iran's 
motivations may never be fully known, it appears that Iran's support of non-state actors is 
primarily influenced by deterrence, as well as by a pragmatic desire for increased 
popularity with Arabs in the region.   
 Iran's goals of overcoming the Sunni-Shia divide by funding Hamas may be 
thwarted by the current Syria conflict.  An Associated Press article notes that both 
Hezbollah and Iran have lost popularity due to supporting Syria's President Bashar Assad.  
The article interprets recent events as shifting the regional balance of power from Shias to 
Sunnis.335  Iran's choice to support an unpopular Arab dictator, combined with a possible 
cessation of funds to Hamas, may damage its previous efforts to bolster its popularity 
amongst Sunni Arabs and increase its regional hegemony.  It may also reverse some 
political capital that Iran gained from supporting non-state actors. 
Conclusion 
 
 Unlike most countries in the Middle East, Iran is nation with a majority Shia 
Muslim population.  This identity plays a role in the country's regional foreign policies, 
especially affecting how Iran navigates its relationships with Sunni Muslim nations in the 
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Middle East.  Iranian policy appears to be driven by pragmatism, but occasionally shows 
signs of religious influence.  First, Iran's ambitions to become a regional hegemon are 
impacted by its Shia identity.  Whether based off actual fears of Shia dominance or 
simply concerns of change to the status quo, Arab nations have expressed fears of a rising 
Iran.  In hopes of quelling these fears and furthering its regional objectives, Iran appears 
to pursue policies emphasizing similarities with Sunni Muslims. 
 Second, Iran's goals in Iraq are influenced by Iran's Shia identity, as well as 
practical considerations of influence and security.  Iran attempts to influence Iraqi politics 
because it aims to promote a friendly, Shia-dominated government in Iraq.  In addition, 
Iran wants to retain regional supremacy and contain Iraq's influence.  For instance, Iran 
wants its city, Qom, to maintain its stature as a foremost city of Shia scholarship, instead 
of being eclipsed by the Iraqi city of Najaf.  Iran leverages economic soft power to 
mitigate this concern. 
  Third, Iran's nuclear ambitions are driven by considerations such as deterrence, 
regional ambitions, and regime legitimacy.  Although Shia apocalyptic concepts may 
have influenced Ahmadinejad, Rouhani is now president, and Khamenei does not appear 
to emphasize these beliefs.  Finally, Iran supports non-state actors like Hezbollah and 
Hamas primarily to enhance its standing in the Arab world and overcome Sunni and Shia 
sectarian concerns.  However, Iran's support of the Syrian regime and its possible 
cessation of funds to Hamas may harm the Persian nation’s popularity amongst Arabs.   
Moreover, as the Arab Spring changes the political landscape of the Middle East, 
Iran's ambitions have been challenged by the dynamically changing regional landscape.  
While neorealism’s concept of the balance of power provides a useful framework for 
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understanding the region during this time, its exclusive focus on state power is inadequate 
for understanding the impact of Sunni/Shia forces and non-state actors in the Middle 
East.  Thus, this theory should be expanded to account for non-state actors that are able to 
impact the regional balance of power.  Additionally, the theory of constructivism can 
help scholars understand identity and state interests present in the Middle East.  
In the future, Iran will likely continue to adopt regional policies that reflect 
pragmatism, including policies that emphasize the nation’s commonalities with Sunni 
Muslim countries.  Shia beliefs may also play a role in Iran’s foreign policy, but these 
factors will likely remain secondary to pragmatic concerns. 
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Chapter 3: Revolutionary Prediction – The Case of Iran 
 
The Arab Spring’s success in overthrowing entrenched authoritarian regimes 
proved a surprise for scholars and the Intelligence Community alike.  These unanticipated 
events suggest the need to rethink assumptions regarding regime stability and consider if 
other nations might be vulnerable to social unrest.  In particular, Iran’s stability should be 
considered given the recent unrest throughout the region.  Many scholars seem to assume 
that without outside intervention, Iran’s current regime will remain in power indefinitely.  
Even though this may prove to be the case, failing to question this assumption could 
prevent scholars from anticipating a future revolution in Iran, similar to how scholars 
were blindsided by the events associated with the Arab Spring and the previous Iranian 
revolution.  As Nikkie Keddie notes about the 1978-1979 Iranian revolution: “. . . 
virtually everyone was ignorant about the coming revolution – and this includes Iranians 
of all classes and the best-informed foreigners.”336  
This thesis chapter will seek to answer the following questions about Iran’s 
stability.  Should scholars anticipate that Iran’s regime will remain intact for the 
foreseeable future?  Could Iran experience social unrest or possibly even a revolution that 
overturns the nation’s current structure of government?  Another option is that Iran’s 
future is impossible to predict.  To answer these questions, this chapter will, first, 
examine the definition of revolutions; and second, consider literature that explores the 
future of Iran’s regime.  Next, the chapter will apply traditional scholarship on 
revolutionary theories to evaluate the possibility of a future revolution in Iran.  While 
various revolutions have similarities, each is shaped by the unique ideology and the 
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shared history of the people who help initiate them.  Thus, to further evaluate these 
theories’ applicability toward Iran, they will also be briefly analyzed in light of Iran’s 
1979 revolution.  The chapter will explore scholarship related to revolution prediction, 
examining if certain conditions can alert scholars to the possibility of a future revolution 
in Iran.  Also considered is the possibility that revolutions, by their very nature, are 
difficult or impossible to predict given the large amount of variables inherent in 
successfully overthrowing a government.  Predicting revolutions can be viewed more as 
an art than a science in this respect.  
This chapter presents a variety of evidence that suggests Iran could experience 
instability in the future, as well as a revolution.  Even though this evidence is not 
conclusive, it demonstrates that most scholars have wrongly assumed that Iran’s regime 
will continue to remain stable.  Additionally, this chapter argues that a gap in scholarship 
exists regarding Iran’s future stability.  Although some scholars have discussed the topic, 
this chapter’s research reveals that this literature is scarce.  One possible explanation for 
the lack of literature is that scholars may simply be assuming the continuance of the 
current regime.  Thus, to avoid being surprised by the future, more scholarship should be 
devoted to the topic of Iran’s regime stability.  This scholarship should ideally combine 
knowledge from area studies and revolutionary theories for maximum effectiveness.  
Additional scholarship should help prevent scholars and policymakers from making 
faulty assumptions regarding the future of Iran’s regime.  
Defining Revolutions  
 
 Although scholars differ on various nuances regarding revolutions, several agree 
on a basic definition of revolutions: movements that quickly bring about significant 
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change in a nation’s political structure.  Theda Skocpol defines social revolutions as 
“rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures . . . accompanied and 
in part carried through by class-based revolts from below.”337  Skocpol distinguishes 
social revolutions from rebellions, which do not impact a nation’s structure; and political 
revolutions, which cause state, but not social, transformation.338  Similarly, according to 
Samuel Huntington, “a full scale revolution . . .  involves the rapid and violent 
destruction of existing political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into politics, 
and the creation of new political institutions.”339  James DeFronzo considers a 
revolutionary movement to be “a social movement in which participants are organized to 
alter drastically or replace totally existing social, economic, or political institutions.”340  
Unlike Huntington, DeFronzo thinks this can occur nonviolently, but notes that most 
successful revolutions contain some violent aspects.341  When referring to revolutions, 
this thesis chapter will use Skocpol’s definition of political revolutions.  
The Future of Iran’s Regime 
 
 Despite the body of literature devoted to revolutions and the Arab Spring, few 
scholars seem to focus on the future of Iran’s regime.  Amongst scholars discussing this 
topic, most seem to think Iran will not have a revolution.  An exception is Jonathan 
Powell, who argues that Syria’s Assad regime will ultimately be toppled, which will lead 
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to an Iranian revolution: “The Iranians have been helping the Syrians with their 
techniques of suppression.  Once the young people of Iran see that those methods do not 
work and that the corrupt Assad regime can be overthrown, they will feel emboldened to 
take up their unfinished revolution once again.”342  Additionally, a modernization study 
conducted by several scholars argues that increasing female education and decreasing 
fertility in Iran will ultimately enhance democracy in the country.343  Although this study 
focuses on democratization rather than revolutions, it still provides helpful analysis of 
Iranian society. 
In contrast, several scholars argue or suggest that Iran’s regime will remain in 
power.  Jack A. Goldstone contends that unlike sultanistic states with a single, corrupt 
leader that causes resentment, Iran has a variety of strong leaders.  Next, he asserts that 
the regime is supported by both the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards, neither of which 
would likely support protestors during social unrest.  Third, he notes that Iran’s 
“ayatollahs espouse an ideology of anti-Western Shiism and Persian nationalism that 
draws considerable support from ordinary people.”344  Nikkie R. Keddie, who views 
revolutionary movements as waves that can influence each other,345 suggests that the 
Arab Spring will not influence a future revolution in Iran due to the country’s 
distinctively non-Arab, Persian identity: “As important as the Shi’i-Sunni divide is the 
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perceived ethnic divide between Persian speakers and Arabic speakers.  Iranians and 
Arabs do not identify ethnically with one another, and many in each group feel hostile to 
one another.  This is an obstacle to cross-ethnic influence.”346  Thus, the Arab Spring may 
not ignite a future Iranian revolution.  However, this conclusion may be premature given 
the ongoing unrest in Syria.  As Powell argues, Syria could inspire a revolution in Iran; or 
conversely, religious and ethnic dissimilarities between the two nations might prevent 
that from occurring. 
Revolutionary Theories 
 
Marx, Engels, and Tocqueville 
 
Scholars have developed a variety of theories to explain revolutions, including 
those articulated by Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and Alexis de Tocqueville; and those 
related to modernization and regime structure.347  These theories provide an important 
framework for understanding revolutions.  Marx and Engels were the first scholars to 
consider a variety of topics central to revolutionary scholarship.  They argue that history 
transitions through stages of feudalism, capitalism, and socialism by a series of 
revolutions.  These revolutions, they believed, would come about via class struggles.348  
While Marx and Engels’ theories may not directly apply to the current situation in Iran, 
their theories are notable because they are the first scholars to articulate revolutionary 
scholarship.   
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In contrast to Marx and Engels, who saw revolutions as catalysts of progress,349 
Tocqueville argues that revolutions enable the state to become more powerful.350  
Regarding the French revolution, Tocqueville cautions that “beneath the seemingly 
chaotic surface there was developing a vast, highly centralized power which attracted to 
itself and welded into an organic whole all the elements of authority and influence that 
hitherto had been dispersed among a crowd of lesser, unco-ordinated powers . . .”351 
Like Tocqueville, Skocpol and Ellen Kay Trimberger emphasize that revolutions 
ultimately strengthen state structures: “It is not just revolutions from above, but all 
revolutions that have become ‘bureaucratic revolutions’ – in the specific sense of creating 
larger, more centralized, and more autonomous state organizations than existed under the 
old regimes.”352  This argument should serve as a caution to scholars, many of whom 
hope that the Arab Spring will enable countries in the Middle East to establish less 
authoritarian or more liberal governments.   
Similarly, Goldstone argues that revolutions always fail to provide all members of 
society with freedom, liberty, and equality.  Moreover, he writes that revolutions often 
negatively impact levels of freedom and liberty.  Goldstone explains that “. . . revolutions 
have often resulted in the exchange of one set of problems . . . for another set of 
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problems.”353  As Tocqueville, Skocpol, Trimberger, and Goldstone suggest, if Iran does 
experience a future revolution, a new Iranian regime might be more oppressive and less 
democratic than the current one.  Thus, regime change in Iran could conceivably have 
negative implications for the region and for U.S.-Iran relations. 
Modernization 
 
 Like Marxism, modernization theory emphasizes the impact of technology and 
the economy on revolutions.  However, modernization theory does not argue for a certain 
progression of history, and does not suggest that specific economic classes will cause 
revolutions.354  Samuel Huntington contends that the optimal condition for revolutions 
exists when social and economic transformation outpaces a society’s political 
development and modernization.  He also emphasizes the importance of political 
participation in revolutions, and explains that a revolution succeeds when mobilization 
creates political institutions.355  In a foreword to Huntington’s Political Order in 
Changing Societies, Francis Fukuyama provides a helpful summary of Huntington’s 
arguments:  
He argued that both traditional and modernized societies tended to be stable; 
problems occurred in the early stages of modernization, when traditional social 
structures were upended by new expectations.  Economic growth could be 
stabilizing, but growth followed by sudden setback created potentially 
revolutionary situations.356 
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Charles Tilly criticizes Huntington’s theory, stating that “the scheme founders in 
tautologies, contradictions, omissions, and failures to examine the evidence seriously.”357 
Although Tilly admits that aspects of Huntington’s theory are compelling,358 he asserts 
that the theory is unsatisfactory because it is unable to help predict revolutions: “Even in 
principle, the scheme is not really a predictive one.  It is an orientation, a proposal to 
weigh several clusters of variables differently from the way they have been estimated n 
the past . . .”359  Moreover, according to Tilly, the concepts of “modernization” and 
“instability” need to be further defined.360  
 Despite Tilly’s criticisms, modernization theory still has several implications for 
Iran.  First, this theory seems to explain Iran’s 1979 revolution more adequately than 
structural theory, which will be discussed in further detail below.  Fukuyama notes that 
the Iranian revolution could be seen as an instance of political institutions being 
surpassed by social mobilization: “The most notable example was the Iranian revolution 
of 1978, when excessively rapid state-driven modernization ran afoul of traditional social 
actors; merchants in the bazaar combined with radical students to produce an Islamic 
revolution.”361  Second, modernization theory could help explain Iran’s Green 
Movement, when mobilized citizens protested an election perceived to be fraudulent.  
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Essentially, these individuals were protesting the failure of political institutions to respect 
their selection of a more moderate candidate. 
 Third, according to modernization theory, the growth or sudden contraction of a 
nation’s economy can lead to a revolution.  Currently, Iran’s economy has been impacted 
by the weight of sanctions due to its nuclear program.  Sanctions directed against Iran 
have weakened the nation’s economy, caused the devaluing of the rial (Iran’s currency), 
and led to increased inflation.362  In 2012/2013, sanctions impacted the production and 
export of Iranian crude oil, and Iran’s economy contracted by an estimated 3 percent.363 
According to a Gallup survey, 56 percent of Iranians believe that “sanctions hurt 
Iranians’ livelihoods.”  Although the poll indicates that most Iranians consider the United 
States, not their own government, to be “most responsible for the sanctions,” the 
widespread impact of sanctions likely poses policy challenges for the Iranian regime.364  
Moreover, the Gallup survey found that “thirty-one percent of Iranians rated their lives 
poorly enough to be considered ‘suffering’ in 2012 – one of the highest rates in the 
greater Middle East North Africa region.”365  
Iran’s significant economic challenges, including the high rate of suffering 
experienced by its people, could contribute to a future revolution.  As mentioned later in 
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this chapter, unemployment can be linked to unrest and regime change.366  Moreover, 
under modernization theory, a reversal of this trend could also have destabilizing effects 
on Iran.  Should negotiations under the new Rouhani government cause some sanctions to 
be lifted, Iran could conceivably experience rapid growth, especially if the sanctions 
allow its oil industry to become more profitable.  This growth could lead to instability 
and a revolt. 
Modernization theory’s emphasis on technology should serve as a reminder that 
technology can have important implications for mass mobilization.  Technology 
influenced social unrest in Iran during the Green Movement,367 when young Iranians used 
Internet technologies such as email and blogs to help with organization, mobilization, and 
communication.368  For example, the Internet helped delegitimize the Iranian regime due 
to the spread of videos and images showing protestors being brutally suppressed by state 
forces.369  Nonetheless, an authoritarian state could use technology to suppress its 
citizens.370  Iran’s regime used a variety of methods to suppress the Green Movement.  
For instance, Iran attempted to restrict Internet access by escalating filtering measures 
and reducing bandwidths and connection speeds.  Iran has also used technology to 
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identify and arrest dissidents.  In particular, the Cyber Force of Iran’s IRGC has 
monitored and arrested activists and bloggers.371  Thus, technology could either harm or 
hinder a future revolution in Iran.  
Structural Theory 
 
 Skocpol and Trimberger, two leading structural theorists, contend that revolutions 
can occur when state structures are destabilized, and that a successful revolution replaces 
old structures with new or altered forms of government.372  Skocpol further articulates her 
theory as follows: 
. . . the repressive state organizations of the prerevolutionary regime have to be 
weakened before mass revolutionary action can succeed, or even emerge. Indeed, 
historically, mass rebellions have not been able, in itself, to overcome state 
repression. Instead, military pressures from abroad, often accompanied by 
political splits between dominant classes and the state, have been necessary to 
undermine repression and open the way for social-revolutionary upheavals from 
below.373 
 
Skocpol also argues against modernization theory, noting that modernization is not 
sufficient to produce revolutions.374  Goldstone, who provides further analysis of 
Skocpol’s theory, explains that the following elements need to coalesce to spur a 
revolution: “a state facing competition from stronger states, an autonomous political elite 
with leverage against the state and the ability to resist taxation and block state policy, and 
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a peasantry with autonomy from direct supervision and a collective framework for 
mobilization . . .”375   
 Under Skocpol’s theory, if Iran’s government is structurally weak, it could be 
vulnerable to a future revolution.  Two elements indicate that Iran possesses a moderate 
degree of structural weakness: it faces significant competition from other states both 
regionally and internationally, and internal opposition movements suggest the existence 
of political schisms that could challenge Iran’s current regime.  First, Iran faces 
competition from a variety of nations.  Iran’s hostile relationship with Israel has 
influenced the nation’s support of Hezbollah and alliance with Syria.  A RAND report 
notes, “With Israel as the only regional state considering military action against Iran as its 
nuclear efforts move forward, the rivalry between Israel and Iran has emerged as a 
defining feature of the current regional environment.”376  Moreover, the competition is 
unequal given that Israel is militarily superior to Iran.377  Next, Iran faces a rivalry with 
the United States, who has enacted stringent policies toward Iran designed to hamper the 
nation’s nuclear program.  Currently, both the United States and the United Nations 
Security Council have sanctions in place against Iran.378  Saudi Arabia, who enjoys a 
good relationship with the United States, also represents a major source of regional 
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competition for Iran.  The two nations could be seen as “represent[ing] opposing poles of 
influence and interests . . .”379  These rivalries likely contribute to Iranian insecurity. 
 Second, Iran’s opposition movements indicate the presence of political schisms, 
which further suggest regime weakness.  The opposition movement/Green Movement is 
comprised of a variety of groups, individuals, and political elites, including student 
groups, the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), the Mojahedin of the Islamic 
Revolution Organization (MIR), the Combatant Clerics Association, and labor unions.380 
The Green Movement has been described as a “struggle between two camps: the religious 
conservatives (traditionalists) who supported the regime and the principle of absolute 
guardianship of the jurist, and liberals, both Islamic and secular.”381  Within the liberal 
camp are religious liberals, who tend to advocate for the current system to be reformed, 
and secular liberals, who would prefer the regime to be overturned.  However, the secular 
liberals have acknowledged religious liberal leaders, such as former president 
Mohammad Khatami and Rafsanjani, Mahdi Karubi, and Mir Hossein Mousavi.382  
Rouhani’s electoral success could indicate the existence of a strong opposition 
element in Iran.383  Nonetheless, scholars and policymakers should remember that 
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Rouhani is a political insider whose campaign emphasized reform, not democracy.384 
Suzanne Maloney notes, “There was nothing in Rouhani’s past experience that suggested 
he might be a closet liberalizer.”385  In addition, Rouhani remains subject to the 
leadership of Khamenei, who will likely retain his influence over judicial, media, and 
military matters.386  Moreover, Rouhani’s win could strengthen Iran’s current regime.  
Katzman argues: “The victory of Rouhani could also revive the popularity of Iran’s 
regime, particularly if Rouhani is able to implement campaign pledges to ease repression 
and social restrictions.”387  
 Other structural elements of Iran’s government could to contribute to the current 
regime’s resiliency.  In particular, Iran’s identity as a post-revolutionary regime could 
help insulate it from other forms of structural weakness.  Levitsky and Way assert that 
revolutionary regimes are more durable than other regimes, and thus less likely to be 
overthrown.388  They emphasize that “revolutionary violence . . . engenders strikingly 
robust regime institutions.”389  For example, Iran’s revolution led to the creation of 
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organizations such as the Basij and the Revolutionary Guard, both of which helped 
suppress protestors during the Green Revolution in 2009.390  Next, Iran’s system of 
government allows for elections, which have traditionally contributed to regime stability.  
Gunes Murat Tezcur argues that the elections “limited the willingness and capacity of 
elites to abandon institutional channels in favor of extraparliamentary strategies.”391 
Third, Iran’s regime has shown resiliency in the face of unrest – it was able to retain 
control despite the 2009 demonstrations.392  
Thus, some structural elements of Iran’s government indicate weakness, whereas 
other aspects suggest regime stability and resiliency.  However, state structure might not 
be as strongly linked to revolutions as Skocpol and Trimberger argue.  For instance, their 
theory may be inadequate to explain the 1979 revolution in Iran.  Charles Kurzman 
states: “Indeed, I argue that the state was not, by several objective measures, particularly 
vulnerable in 1978 when widespread protests emerged.  Instead, Iranians seem to have 
based their assessment of the opportunities for protest on the perceived strength of the 
opposition.”393  Even Skocpol herself, in an article written after the Iranian revolution, 
admits that the revolution “challenged expectations about revolutionary causation that I 
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developed . . .”394  However, Skocpol affirmed the importance of structural theory, 
further noting that in her work, States and Social Revolutions, she had included the caveat 
that a general revolutionary theory could never apply to all circumstances.395 
Nonetheless, she still admitted that the Iranian revolution “did not just come; it was 
deliberately and coherently made – specifically in its opening phase, the overthrow of the 
old regime.”396  
Eric Selbin notes that scholars are challenging structuralism due to happenings in 
Iran and Nicaragua.  In particular, some scholars are emphasizing the impact of ideology, 
human decision-making, and culture on revolutions.  Selbin’s argument that people and 
ideology influence revolutions397 highlights an important flaw of structural theory: the 
failure to account for historical grievances and ideologies that could drive a group of 
people to revolt, regardless of whether weaknesses exist in their government’s structure.  
As Selbin articulates, “agents and structure both play critical roles, which may shift and 
vary over time, in any revolutionary process.”398  Thus, structural theory may be best 
understood when combined with a historical and ideological understanding of countries 
and people groups.  Goldstone argues that scholars may have failed to predict revolutions 
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in the past because they were experts in area studies, not revolutions.399  Conversely, 
revolutionary theories might fall short because they fail to take area studies under 
account.  An ideal understanding of revolutions would unite the disciplines of area 
studies and revolutionary theory for a complete picture of how revolutions occur.  
Predicting Revolutions 
 
 While some scholars contend that revolutions can be anticipated and provide 
suggestions for their prediction, others argue that predicting revolutions is a difficult or 
impossible feat.  Goldstone defines revolution prediction as identifying “states that are 
moving rapidly toward a revolutionary situation, so that if trends continue unchecked a 
revolution is highly likely to break out when a triggering or accelerating event occurs.”400  
He asserts that revolutions can be predicted within a one to two year timeframe, but 
cautions that scholars cannot precisely determine a revolution’s timing.401  Goldstone 
offers three elements he believes can serve as a model for revolution prediction: 
. . . the model argues that a society is careening toward revolution when there 
arises a conjuncture of three conditions: (1) the state loses effectiveness in its 
ability to command resources and obedience; (2) elites are alienated from the state 
and in heightened conflict over the distribution of power and status; and (3) a 
large or strategic portion of the population can be readily mobilized for protest 
actions.402  
 
DeFronzo also provides a list of similar elements he believes are likely needed for a 
successful revolution: widespread discontentment that spurs anti-government protests, 
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elite movements opposed to the current regime, widespread revolutionary motivators that 
unify a broad swath of the populace, and a state political crisis.403  
 Goldstone and DeFronzo’s models help provide clarity regarding why the 2009 
Green Movement protests did not overthrow Iran’s regime.  Despite facing unrest, Iran 
never lost its ability to “command resources and obedience,” as Goldstone articulated.404  
The state responded to the demonstrations with violence and was ultimately able to quell 
the unrest.405  Next, although elites were involved in the Green Movement, as noted 
above, they tended to be religious leaders interested in reform, not overthrow of the 
regime.406  Finally, the movement failed to inspire widespread appeal beyond the urban 
middle class.  Tezcur states that “the reformist leadership could not establish coalitions 
transcending class, regional, and ethnic differences.”407  Similarly, Farideh Farhi 
explains, “The Green Movement is representative of only a portion of the middle class in 
Iran.  In short, the Islamic Republic has given birth to an ideologically differentiated 
middle class.”  Farhi further notes that elements of middle class are also supportive of 
conservatives and hardliners.408  If Iran’s opposition movement built a broader base of 
support and attracted elite leaders interested in regime change instead of reform, it could 
be more effective in challenging the current regime and spurring a revolution.  Because 
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Iran’s opposition movement has not evolved to this point, based on Goldstone and 
DeFronzo’s criteria, Iran does not seem poised for an imminent, future revolution.  
However, Iran’s opposition movement could conceivably change, thus making a 
revolution more likely in the future.  
Specific Indicators 
 
 Goldstone cautions that scholars should avoid making lists that identify specific 
conditions for revolutions.409  However, some scholars have argued that certain indicators 
are tied to revolutions.  Generally, these scholars do not offer comprehensive lists, but 
rather examine one or two conditions they believe could point to the possibility of future 
revolution.  For instance, various scholars have argued that youth bulges – or a large 
population of youth – can lead to a higher risk of violence.410  Henrik Urdal evaluated 
this claim by using data on internal armed conflict from 1950 to 2000.  His analysis links 
youth bulges to terrorist acts, riots and violent protests, and internal armed conflict.411  In 
a UNICEF working paper, Isabel Ortiz and Matthew Cummins note that many countries 
are facing unemployment concerns, as well as a youth bulge.412  According to Ortiz and 
Cummins, countries with youth bulges are especially susceptible to social and political 
unrest.413  Moreover, their paper considers unemployment as strongly related to increased 
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social unrest and, ultimately, regime change.414  These issues have important implications 
for Iran, given that Iran was listed as number 73 in a chart titled “top 80 countries with 
largest share of youth in total national population, 2012” and number 25 in a table titled 
“top 50 countries with lowest youth employment-to-population ratios, 2010.”415 
  Another possible factor related to a revolution’s success is the response of a 
nation’s armed forces to revolt.  According to Zoltan Barany, for revolutions to succeed, 
they usually need to be backed by a segment of the regular army.416  Barany notes that 
while it is not the only condition for a successful revolution,  “. . . the military’s backing 
of or at least neutrality toward the revolution is a necessary condition for revolutionary 
success.”417  Furthermore, Barany argues that it is possible to intelligently guess an armed 
forces’ response to revolt.418  Based on its response to the Green Movement, Iran’s 
military would likely back the regime and possibly engage in suppression measures 
should a future revolution arise.  However, the Arab Spring showed that revolutions can 
continue despite facing violence from the current regime.  For instance, the revolution in 
Syria continued despite the harsh suppression measures used by the government.419  
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John James Kennedy identifies several factors he believes led to the revolutions in 
Tunisia and Egypt, including a population that is extensively dissatisfied with top 
political leaders.420  Although discontent might be an important element in revolution 
prediction, Iranians’ perceptions of the regime are difficult to assess due to the need to be 
sensitive while conducting surveys.421  Data from a 2012 Pew Research survey indicates 
that Iranians have varied perceptions on clerical involvement in politics, which suggests 
that Iranians could have mixed views on their current government led by a supreme, 
clerical leader.  A majority of Iranians (66 percent) thought that “religious figures should 
have at least some influence in political matters,” but only 40 percent of Iranians wanted 
religious figures to hold a large amount of influence.422  A study by RAND Corporation 
shows that a significant number of Iranians support many of Iran’s current policies, but 
also notes that some respondents seemed uncomfortable with the survey and may have 
been worried about government monitoring.423  Therefore, this indicator is challenging to 
apply due to the difficulties associated with conducting surveys in Iran.    
Revolutions Cannot Be Predicted 
 
 Some scholars contend that revolutions are difficult or possibly impossible to 
predict and, as such, will continue to surprise scholars.  For instance, Timur Kuran states 
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that scholars can determine which nations will likely encounter revolution, but because of 
preference falsification, revolutions will continue to be surprising.  Kuran further 
explains: “The argument hinges on preference falsification – the act of misrepresenting 
one’s preferences under perceived social pressures.  By falsifying their preferences with 
regard to the incumbent regime, disgruntled citizens distort perceptions of the potential 
for political change.”424  
Revolutions may also be difficult to predict due to challenges with timing.  Eva 
Bellin writes that the Arab Spring had a contagious effect – individuals throughout the 
region became empowered when they saw Tunisia’s Ben Ali successfully deposed.  
Bellin essentially suggests that because revolutions can influence each other, a successful 
model for revolution prediction would be difficult (or impossible) to develop.425  
Similarly, according to Jeff Goodwin, the Tunisian fruit vendor who lit himself on fire 
helped spur “something like a ‘revolutionary bandwagon’” that impacted the subsequent 
revolutions in Egypt and Syria.  Goodwin further argues that the extent of this 
revolutionary spread could not have been predicted.426  Furthermore, Keddie argues that 
revolutions might be able to be predicted, but many “occur in new conditions and have 
largely new patterns.”  Thus, it is unsurprising that some revolutions are not 
anticipated.427  
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 Bellin and Kuran’s arguments are compelling, especially when considering that 
revolutionary theories often fail to explain every instance of regime overthrow.  In 
addition, theories frequently do not consider ideological and historical factors, elements 
that could also be difficult to quantify into a model.  Moreover, some indicators, such as a 
population’s support of the current regime, can be difficult to assess via surveys and are 
likely tainted by preference falsification.  However, theories and indicators, while not 
perfect, can still provide scholars and policymakers with a framework for analysis and 
alert scholars to the possibility of a future revolution.  Theories and indicators should 
inspire analysis, and thus should prevent scholars and policymakers from blindly 
assuming that a regime will continue indefinitely.    
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, what do these theories, indicators, and studies tell us about the 
future of Iran’s regime?  The information discussed in this chapter indicates that Iran’s 
future is less certain than most scholars seem to assume.  The variety of evidence 
examined, although inconclusive, shows that weaknesses present in Iran’s regime could 
lead to future regime change.  Under modernization theory, Iran could experience a 
future revolution if its economic difficulties continue, or if the nation experiences rapid 
economic growth due to the lifting of sanctions.  Structural theory suggests that Iran’s 
government has both strengths and weaknesses.  Iran is currently facing competition from 
several strong states, including Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia; as well as 
possible internal political schisms that could lead to instability.  However, Iran is also a 
post-revolutionary, durable regime that has proven to be resilient.   
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Scholars have identified various indicators that help predict social unrest and 
regime overthrow, but these indicators fail to provide conclusive guidance regarding 
Iran’s future.  While Iran has a large population of youth, Iran’s military would likely not 
support a future revolution, and Iranian perceptions of the current regime are difficult to 
assess.  In addition, the unrest in Syria could help spark a revolution in Iran, but the two 
countries might be too dissimilar for this to occur.  Ultimately, although Iran’s future is 
unknown, the mixed evidence suggests that many scholars have placed too much 
confidence in the longevity of the current Iranian regime.  This topic appears to be a blind 
spot in most current scholarship and is worthy of increased attention from academic 
community and policymakers alike.  
 The research and analysis contained in this chapter offers additional implications 
for scholars and policymakers.  First, more overlap needs to occur between area studies 
and revolutionary scholarship.  Revolutionary theories have traditionally ignored 
important factors often tied to area studies, such as a nation’s history, religion, and 
ideology.  In contrast, area studies scholars occasionally ignore revolutionary scholarship, 
and thus, are surprised when revolutions occur.  Second, revolution prediction is more of 
an art than a science, and may not be able to offer concrete, conclusive guidance 
regarding a nation’s future.  However, theories and indicators can still help scholars 
identify red flags that might indicate future unrest or regime change.  Third, to avoid 
future revolutionary surprises, more research should be devoted to the possibility of 
future revolutions, particularly relating to Iran.  While conducting research, scholars and 
policymakers should avoid assuming that regimes will remain stable, but instead retain an 




 Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the United States’ relationship with Iran has 
been fraught with enmity.  U.S. policymakers and scholars must seek solutions to 
improve this relationship, given that Iran threatens U.S. security interests, controls a 
portion of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, and holds a position of influence in the Middle 
East.  The historically strained relationship between the two countries suggests that 
scholars and policymakers should attempt to improve their understanding of Iran.  This 
thesis attempts to lessen this gap by providing insight into various aspects of Iran’s 
behavior, with an emphasis on various international relations and revolutionary theories.  
Chapter one considers a topic of international significance: Iran’s nuclear 
program.  In particular, this chapter considers what policies the United States should 
adopt that could best impede Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  First, the chapter analyzes 
examines two international relations theories – realism and liberalism – and subsequently 
considers how they can help explain Iran’s behavior and inform policymaking.  Second, 
the chapter considers the status of Iran’s nuclear program.  Evidence presented in this 
section demonstrates that Iran’s nuclear capabilities should be of concern to U.S. 
policymakers.  Third, the chapter examines various policy options, arguing that the 
United States should pursue a multi-policy approach of engagement, public diplomacy, 
and sanctions.  While nuclear talks under Iran’s Rouhani administration are a promising 
development in U.S.-Iran relations, sanctions should not be lifted unless the outcome of 
such talks serves U.S. security interests.  Moreover, the United States should strive to act 
multilaterally towards Iran, as this enhances U.S. legitimacy, increases policy 
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effectiveness, promotes the judicious use of U.S. power, and prolongs the United States’ 
position as the world hegemon.  
 In chapter two, this thesis examines Iran’s regional behavior by analyzing how 
Shiism influences Iran’s regional policymaking.  To provide a framework for this 
analysis, this chapter begins by considering neorealism and constructivism.  This section 
argues that neorealism’s balance of power concept fails to align with regional dynamics 
present in the Middle East because it focuses solely on state behavior.  Because non-state 
actors contribute to Middle Eastern power dynamics, they should be included in the 
balance of power equation.  This section also asserts that constructivism can help scholars 
better comprehend matters of identity and state interest, but lacks a mechanism for 
helping scholars determine state intentions.  Next, this chapter analyzes how Iran’s Shia 
identity impacts several aspects of Iranian foreign policy.  In particular, the chapter looks 
at Iran’s aspirations toward regional hegemony, its strategic relationship with Iraq, its 
nuclear ambitions, and its support of Hamas and Hezbollah.  The chapter concludes by 
arguing that Shiism has less influence on Iranian foreign policy than pragmatism.  
 Chapter three analyzes whether Iran’s regime will remain stable for the 
foreseeable future.  This national or internal topic has particular salience given that 
revolutions often take scholars by surprise, as illustrated by the Arab Spring and the 
Iranian revolution of 1979.  Although a few scholars have considered the issue, 
scholarship is limited and weighted toward the opinion that Iran will retain its current 
system of government.  However, when examined through the lens of revolutionary 
theory, Iran’s government appears susceptible to unrest or a revolution.  Moreover, the 
youth bulge present in Iran could lead to future instability.  Even so, a future Iranian 
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revolution might be a harmful development for the United States.  As Theda Skocpol and 
Ellen Kay Trimberger argue, revolutions create “larger, more centralized, and more 
autonomous state organizations than existed under the old regimes.”428  Finally, chapter 
three argues that revolutionary surprises occur because area studies and revolutionary 
theory often fail to work in tandem.  Theorists and area studies scholars, therefore, should 
seek to combine their areas of expertise to better anticipate revolutions. 
Lessons Learned 
 
1. Policymakers and Scholars Must Understand How Shiism Impacts Iran’s 
Behavior 
 
 This thesis portfolio offers four important insights into Iran’s behavior.  First, to 
understand Iran, scholars and policymakers need to possess a knowledge of Shiism.  Iran 
has the largest population of Shias in the world,429 but only 10 to 15 percent of Muslims 
worldwide are Shia.430  As discussed in chapter two of this portfolio, Iran’s government is 
based on Khomeini’s theory of velayat-e-faqih, which asserts that Shia clerics have the 
authority to rule politically.431  Iran’s Shia identity has important implications for its 
system of government, but can impede Iran’s attempts to build relations with other 
Middle Eastern, predominantly Sunni countries – a task further complicated by the fact 
that Iran is Persian, not Arab.  Moreover, Sunni nations have expressed suspicion towards 
Iran’s attempts to gain regional influence.  For example, Jordan’s King Abdullah II 
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famously cautioned that a “Shiite crescent” was stretching from Iran and Iraq towards 
Lebanon and Syria.432  To mitigate these concerns, Iran appears to downplay its Shia 
identity when attempting to relate to Sunni nations.  Iran’s support of Hezbollah and 
Hamas, along with its vitriolic rhetoric against Israel and the West, could be attempts to 
garner support from Arab nations.  Ray Takeyh asserts, “. . . Iran's inflammatory 
denunciations (even of Israel) can be partly attributed to its attempt to mobilize the region 
behind its leadership.”433   
Nonetheless, as chapter three argues, Iran seems to emphasize its Shia identity 
when relating to other Shias, including the Shia community in Iraq.  For instance, Iran 
funds Iraqi Shia political parties and sends scholars and students to the Iraqi Shia cities of 
Karbala and Najaf.  However, these actions seem largely motivated by practical, rather 
than religious, considerations.  Iran would likely have a better relationship with an Iraq 
governed primarily by Shias, rather than Sunnis.  In addition, Iran’s use of economic soft 
power toward Iraq is likely intended to mitigate the influence of Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah 
‘Ali al-Sistani, who does not vocally support the Iranian concept of velayat-e faqih.  
Thus, Shiism and veyalat-e faqih are important to understand because they impact Iran’s 
system of government and its regional posture. 
2. Iran is a Rational Actor 
 
Second, despite its provocative rhetoric and belligerent actions, Iran is primarily a 
pragmatic actor whose foreign policies are driven by rational objectives.  As argued in a 
RAND report: “Our exploration of Iranian strategic thinking revealed that ideology and 
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bravado frequently mask a preference for opportunism and realpolitik–the qualities that 
define ‘normal’ state behavior.”434  Iran’s pragmatism has important implications for 
understanding the nation’s behavior, especially regarding the nuclear program.  First, this 
thesis argues that the Iranian nuclear program is primarily motivated by deterrence, 
regional goals, and internal regime popularity.  Admittedly, Ahmadinejad’s support of the 
nuclear program could have been motivated by apocalyptic Shia messianism.  In 
particular, evidence suggests that Ahmadinejad was part of a group that believed that the 
return of the Mahdi could be sped up through technology.435  However, Ahmadinejad 
likely had less control over Iran’s nuclear program than the more rational Khamenei.  
Moreover, Iran’s current president, Rouhani, is likely more rational than Ahmadinejad 
and has been described as having a “centrist-pragmatic agenda.”436  Thus, it seems likely 
that Iran’s nuclear program is currently motivated by rational considerations.  
Next, pragmatism should impact how U.S. policymakers view the Iranian nuclear 
threat.  Even if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, its use would likely be limited to cases 
of regime survival.  However, the United States should still attempt to prevent Iran from 
developing a nuclear weapon, given that such a weapon would increase Iran’s stature in 
the region and provide the nation with additional leverage.  This could have negative 
implications for U.S. energy security and key U.S. relationships in the region, including 
the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia and Israel.  Moreover, the United States 
would likely be forced to adopt a more cautious posture toward Iran. 
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Iran’s rationality suggests that the nation might be willing to agree to a long-term 
nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries, especially if an agreement removes sanctions 
currently directed toward Iran.  Although the nuclear program benefits Iran, it also comes 
at a cost to the nation’s economy.  Due to sanctions levied against Iran, Iran’s oil exports 
dropped from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to 1 million barrels per day by late 
2013.  This decrease has significant implications for Iran’s government, which depends 
on oil exports to fund almost half of its expenditures.  A report by the Congressional 
Research Service assesses that the sanctions levied against Iran drove the nation to accept 
an interim agreement on November 24, 2013.437  Although research examined in chapter 
one indicates that sanctions are often ineffective, in this instance, they could help spur 
Iran toward accepting a more permanent nuclear deal.  A potentially effective agreement, 
therefore, could appeal to Iran’s pragmatism by promising economic relief. 
3. Theories and Area Studies Need to Work Together 
 
 Third, this thesis demonstrates that theories are most effective when combined 
with area studies.  Specifically, this thesis showed that revolutionary theory, when 
applied to Iran, indicates that Iran’s system of government is less stable than many 
scholars tend to assume.  Modernization theory should prompt scholars to examine 
economic factors and consider whether they could contribute to a future revolution.  
Under this theory, Iran could experience instability and possibly a revolution if Rouhani’s 
government is unable to lift the sanctions and improve Iran’s economic condition.  
Conversely, given that modernization theory argues that economic growth can be 
destabilizing, instability could also occur if Iran experiences sudden growth.   
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Next, scholars should consider whether governments possess structural 
weaknesses, which could also lead to a revolution.  Structural theory, as articulated by 
Theda Skocpol, argues that “military pressures from abroad, often accompanied by 
political splits between dominant classes and the state, have been necessary to undermine 
repression and open the way for social-revolutionary upheavals from below.”438  When 
applied to Iran, this theory also suggests that Iran’s government is unstable.  Iran faces 
pressures from a variety of nations, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.  
In addition, a variety of Iranian opposition groups have already contributed to instability 
via protests associated with the Green Movement.   
Revolutionary theory should also prompt scholars and policymakers to view 
revolutions cautiously, given that they can often hamper democracy.  By pointing to the 
French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville argues that revolutions create stronger, more 
authoritarian states.439  This should remind scholars and policymakers that a revolution in 
Iran might lead to a less democratic Iranian regime and could be a negative development 
for U.S.-Iran relations.   
4. Multiple Policies Should Be Adopted Toward Iran 
 
 Fourth, to improve its relationship with Iran and reduce security concerns, the 
United States should adopt multiple policies toward Iran.  As James Dobbins has argued, 
“sanctions and negotiations are not alternatives” and are effective when exercised in 
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tandem.440  In addition, the United States should intensify public diplomacy initiatives 
directed toward Iran.  Walter R. Roberts explains that the goal of public diplomacy is “to 
create, for a given country, as positive a climate as possible among foreign publics in 
order to facilitate the explanation and hopefully acceptance of its foreign policy.”441  
Although specific funding information regarding U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward 
Iran is unavailable, this funding appears to have decreased in priority.  Thus, United 
States should consider increasing this funding as a way of expanding U.S. soft power 
toward Iran.  In particular, as suggested by several RAND scholars, the United States 
should support radio broadcasts, educational exchanges, and interactions between U.S. 
officials and members of Iran’s media.442  Public diplomacy should not seek to directly 
cause regime change, but should encourage moderation in Iranian politics and a greater 
understanding of U.S. policy.  In addition, public diplomacy must be conducted 
cautiously, as overt western support for Iranian opposition elements could actually harm 
these groups’ effectiveness.  
Additional Research 
 
The current body of literature can be divided into two camps: theorists who focus 
on international relations and revolutionary theories, and area studies scholars who often 
concentrate on historical and political factors.  As mentioned previously, additional 
research should seek to combine these two schools of thought.  In particular, scholars 
should revisit the balance of power concept and consider whether a revision or a new 
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theory could better fit with the current climate in the Middle East.  Scholars should also 
use modernization and structural revolutionary theory to evaluate their assumptions 
regarding Iran’s regime stability.  In addition, realism, liberalism, and constructivism can 
provide insights into Iran’s behavior, help explain regional dynamics, and assist with 
policymaking.  
Further research should also focus on developing strategies for the ongoing 
nuclear talks with Iran.  The United States must ensure that the resulting long-term 
agreement advances U.S. security interests without significantly ostracizing allies such as 
Israel and Saudi Arabia.  Moreover, the United States must also consider whether the 
talks should address other areas of concern, such as Iran’s support for terrorist groups and 
its human rights violations.  Given that Iran is motivated by pragmatic concerns, 
negotiation strategies should likely include the offer to reduce or remove sanctions in 
exchange for Iran’s cooperation.  Ultimately, Iran will have to determine whether its 
strategic goals are best achieved by defying the international community and continuing 
its nuclear program, or by acceding to an agreement that provides the nation with relief 
from sanctions. 
Going forward, U.S. foreign policy must continue to prioritize Iran by adopting 
strategies designed to improve U.S.-Iran relations and mitigate security concerns.  To 
accomplish these objectives, scholars and policymakers must seek a greater 
understanding of Iran’s behavior and craft their scholarship and policymaking 
accordingly.  The new Iranian administration under President Rouhani appears open to 
improving its relationship with United States and the West.  Although the United States’ 
relationship with Iran will likely not dramatically improve in the immediate future, the 
 122 
United States should cautiously engage the new administration in hopes that a less hostile 
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